INTRODUCTION

The violent breakup of Yugoslavia was accompanied by the largest forced mass migrations in Europe since 1945. Despite the fact that these migrations affected only a relatively small territory and only a small number of countries, their impact was certainly not merely a local matter. Due to the considerable number of refugees, the events of former Yugoslavia directly or indirectly affected not only the immediately neighbouring states but practically the whole of Europe (Sardon 2001:51).

The aim of the submitted article is to present an analysis of external migration from and to the territory of former Yugoslavia after 1990 and to identify its impact on international relations. In the first section the authors present the character and fundamental attributes of the migrations brought about by the breakup of Yugoslavia, and in the next section they attempt to determine material and temporal connections between the changes to the migration and integration policy of the destination countries in response to the humanitarian crisis in Yugoslavia. The authors also attempt to map the possible influences of the southern Slavic and Kosovo communities on international relations, primarily on the level of bilateral relations between the successor states of former Yugoslavia and countries hosting large communities of persons of southern Slavic origin.

From the conducted analysis it ensues that migration after 1990 was primarily forced and was in connection with military conflicts and human rights violations on a mass scale. In addition to this, external migration was also stimulated by a strong economic motivation.

The destination and potential destination countries progressively formulated a strategy for conflict resolution, which resides in a strict time limitation of the residence of refugees (status of temporary protection) and is intended to prevent their permanent settlement: the political endeavour was directed towards ensuring the security of the displaced persons directly on the site of the conflict or in the immediate surroundings thereof, and specific political solutions are also adapted to this target, in particular with regard to speed and effectiveness. Visa policy is also adapted towards this goal, and there is an evident trend to prevent any uncontrollable and unregulated mass migrations of population.

Key words: migration, former Yugoslavia, Europe, migration policy, international relations.
of southern Slavic origin (e.g. Austria, Germany and Switzerland). We rest on the assumption that the problems and risks in connection with the migrations of citizens caused by the breakup of Yugoslavia were observed very attentively and sensitively and that their internal political impacts have a wider validity.

**METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS, LIMITS OF RESEARCH STUDY**

The data source for investigation of migration flows, in the case of former Yugoslavia, is beset with a range of errors and intentional mystifications, and it is not possible to obtain entirely precise data. Statistics of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) produced by UNHCR are relatively credible, even if the main criterion for inclusion of their data is not the fulfilment of characteristic attributes but the legal fact of registration of a person within the given category (regardless of the person’s legitimacy).

Fundamentally more complex is the identification of economic migrants: statistics in general identify legal immigration relatively well (again thanks to the necessity of formal registration, obtaining a visa, work permit, residence permit) – even if they differ in the definitions – but they fail in the recording of emigration (emigrants frequently see no need to “report” this matter, and in periods of extreme military conflicts frequently do not have the opportunity to do so).

In this respect the statistics from Yugoslavia itself are practically unusable; for example the Croatian Državni zavod za statistiku records almost 455 thousand immigrants in the years 1993-2006, whereas the number of emigrants only slightly exceeds 137 thousand (the recorded balance of foreign migration is then +318 thousand), which is characteristically unrealistic. Identifying emigration is naturally problematic also in the statistically most highly developed countries, but unlike the states of former Yugoslavia there is as a rule greater willingness on the part of the population to co-operate with statistical investigations. With regard to this fact, it is necessary to adjust the data provided by the statistical offices for the purposes of mutual comparison. We rely on the original statistical data in those cases where reductions were not necessary, in other cases we rely on those literary sources which primarily engaged with the problem.

Another limit of our research is the method of recording statistical evidence of migrating persons itself. Whereas migrants from the region of former Yugoslavia are primarily loyal to their ethnic origin and feel solidarity with persons of their own nation without regard to their legal relationship to the target country of migration, statistics mostly group migrants together on the basis of their citizenship and frequently do not determine data concerning ethnicity whatsoever. Especially in the case of former Yugoslavia, categories are created which incorporate migrants across various ethnic origins and do not correspond to how the migrants group together naturally in the destination country. For example, in the Czech Republic a considerable proportion of foreign nationals with Serbian citizenship are composed of Kosovan Albanians entirely hostile to Serbia, but quantification of these persons is possible only by indirect estimates.

**CHARACTER AND FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF MIGRATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA**

The territory of former Yugoslavia as a whole is an emigration territory over the long term, which in essence is continually losing inhabitants by means of emigration. Periods during which former Yugoslavia has had a positive migration balance are only brief interludes caused by return of migrant workers employed abroad for whom there was no longer

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1 Direct falsifications relate only to war refugees and we can classify these into two categories: intentional raising or reduction with the aim of gaining the sympathy of the international public, demoralising the enemy, increasing the deterrent effect or manipulation with criminal intent (parasitic misuse of humanitarian aid).
2 E.g. registration of illegal economic migrants for the purpose of legalisation of residence.
3 E.g. for 2003 the German statistical office recorded 11,467 citizens emigrating from Croatia and 11,876 departing for Croatia, whereas the Croatian statistical office on the basis of a different definition recorded only 1,278 persons and 1,020 persons respectively (i.e. fundamentally lower number and reversed balance of migration).
4 Sum total according to Priopćenja, Broj 7.1.2. – Migracija stanovništva Republike Hrvatske 2006 and previous years, available online: http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/publication/FirstRelease/firstrel.asp (28.9.2010)
employment (1930s, second half of 1970s), or periods of repatriation of fugitives displaced during the course of political crises, mostly with an ethnic or religious background.

The directions, course and volume of waves of migration caused by war (in the case of a certain number of people undoubtedly used merely as a justification) was heavily influenced by the practically continuous tradition of emigration from the region, even though the migrations in the 1990s were of an entirely specific character. In general the paths of movement of refugees and applicants for asylum are influenced by a number of different factors (Adjusted and adapted to local situation according to Bade (2005:341-342):

1. **Distance of regions of origin and destination and transport aspects** – speed and availability of connections.
2. **Existing economic, political and cultural links**, possible similarity of language; this in particular concerns the existence of informal networks in destination states which could arrange work, accommodation or social assistance for migrants.
3. **Traditions of migration** (even if the causes of migration in the past may have been different – ethnic, economic, political).
4. **Different economic and social attractiveness** of individual destination countries.
5. **Asylum policy** and application of asylum rights in destination countries.

The direct military conflicts in connection with the breakup of Yugoslavia in Slovenia (June-July 1991), Croatia (June 1991-January 1992 and May-August 1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (March 1992-December 1995), Kosovo (Spring 1998-June 1999) and Macedonia (May-June 2001) claimed the lives of tens of thousands of victims and forced millions of people to leave their original homes. The masses of refugees had various destinations according to their nationality – e.g. refugees of Serbian nationality from Croatia headed for Serbia, whereas refugees of Croatian nationality emigrated beyond the borders of former Yugoslavia, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the primary destinations of Muslims were Croatia, Slovenia and European countries, in the case of Serbs naturally Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent regions outside of former Yugoslavia (Raduski 2000:116). Specific features of the conflict were that:

a) the majority of refugees remained within the territory of former Yugoslavia, whereas there was a fundamentally lower number of refugees fleeing to states beyond former Yugoslavia,

b) the number displaced persons was – and to date continues to be – exceptionally high.6

The motivations for migration were various, the most visible part composed of victims of “ethnic cleansing” (etičko čišćenje), who were violently forced to abandon their original homes by one of the warring parties. The mechanism of “ethnic cleansing” itself comprised a combination of physical violence towards persons (killing, armed expulsion from homes), destruction of property (in particular real estate), denial of political rights (e.g. citizenship), informal or also direct discrimination (loss of employment, functional or social status, intimidation in social contact etc. – Šuvar 2000:197; model situation presented e.g. by Mesić 1992). The triggering mechanism which brought about mass movement of people was frequently only in the form of threats, psychological pressure or mass psychosis (in particular during the course of or immediately following military conflicts).

In addition to forced migration in connection with armed conflicts, inhabitants of the former Yugoslav republics also emigrated for economic reasons. Amongst the main motivating factors were the impossibility of finding gainful employment and the loss of prospects in life. For example, in the 1990s approximately as many as 900 thousand persons left Serbia, in particular younger and more educated persons (Pelikán et al. 2004:53), whilst

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5 Most of all in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where estimates are within a very wide range, from 20 thousand up to 329 thousand, most frequently the number of victims is however estimated at between 100 and 250 thousand persons, compare Žila (2007).

6 The difference between the terms refugee and internally displaced person is as follows: if displaced persons cross international borders they become refugees, whilst persons forced to migrate within their state are termed internally displaced persons. In the specific situation of the disintegrating Yugoslavia, we shall use the term refugee also for persons crossing the borders of the former republics, without regard to whether these republics were formally independent at the time (with the exception of the Montenegrin-Serbian border and the border of Kosovo).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number (in thousands)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Part of Croatia</th>
<th>Target country/area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>Conflict areas</td>
<td>European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>Eastern Slavonia</td>
<td>Serbia, Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>Whole territory, mainly Serbian Krajina</td>
<td>Serbia, Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>former Serbian Krajina</td>
<td>Serbia, European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees total</td>
<td>430</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>territory under government control</td>
<td>territory under government control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>territory under government control, mainly towns</td>
<td>territory under Serbian military control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>former Serbian Krajina</td>
<td>Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem/Srijem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs total</td>
<td>380</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>700*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * estimate, part of IDPs became refugees in 1995

in Croatia the number of economic migrants during the same period is approaching 200 thousand (Čizmić and Živić 2005:61). Another example can be provided by Bosnia and Herzegovina, from where approximately 42 thousand persons emigrated following the signature of the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995 up to the end of March 1998. The main reasons given were in particular the feeling of insecurity with regard to the post-war development and the high level of unemployment (Bošnjović 1999:124).

The economically motivated migrations of the 1990s are merely an extension of the general trend from the period before 1990 and are generally in the form of temporary emigrations for a season or a few years, whilst maintaining close ties to the original country of residence. These movements are compensated to a considerable degree by return migrations of persons who lose the possibility of employment abroad (due to age or competence), gain the possibility of subsistence at home or have achieved their economic goals. Quantification is extraordinarily difficult (naturalisation of a number of migrants, emigration to third countries, “statistical overlap” otherwise motivated by migrations), but it is clear that when return migration is calculated the situation appear to be far less dramatic than would appear from the previous paragraph. As an illustrative example we can select migration from Serbia and Montenegro: if we choose migration to the main country of destination – Germany – in the period of time not affected by forced migrations, e.g. the period from 1995-20017, the number of those emigrating (339.3 thousand) is practically identical to the number immigrating (339.4 thousand – re-calculation of data stated in Rühl and Currle 2004:68-69, 71-72). Emigration to Austria in the same period was compensated by immigration of three quarters of the number, and to Switzerland by one half etc.

7 Forced migration from Kosovo was compensated for during this period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number (in thousands)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Part of Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Target country/area</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
<td>mainly European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>Bosniak-Croat Federation</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Internally displaced persons*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number (in thousands)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Target country/area</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs total</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number (in thousands)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Target country/area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>Vojvodina, Central Serbia</td>
<td>Croatia, European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1998</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>Albanians, Serbs</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Kosovo (IDPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Albanians, Serbs</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Central Serbia, Vojvodina (IDPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (Mar-Jun)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>IDPs, Macedonia, Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (Jul-Sep)</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Serbs, Roma</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>mainly Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 (Mar)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Serbs, Roma</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Macedonia – main waves of refugees. Source: UNHCR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number (in thousands)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Target country/area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 (May)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Macedonians, Albanians</td>
<td>Conflict areas</td>
<td>Serbia/Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 (May), IDPs</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Macedonia</td>
<td>Northwestern Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>Conflict areas</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Macedonia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With regard to the fact that in the 1990s economic migrations did not deviate from the trend of the preceding period, we shall focus in the following overview primarily on politically or ethnically conditioned migrations. We present a detailed outline of the political background in the individual areas of former Yugoslavia, as well as a detailed statistical overview of all significant flows of migration according to the individual republics, stating the chief causes and impacts of migration and presenting a critical evaluation of the available data, on the size of the given flows of migration in another study (Fišukal and Šrubař 2008), here we restrict ourselves only to a summary in table form. From tables 1 to 4 it ensues that approximately 4.3 million persons were forced to abandon their homes during the years 1991-2001, in which the proportion of refugees to internally displaced persons was approximately 60:40. It is however necessary to add that only quarter of all fugitives departed for third countries, i.e. beyond the territory of former Yugoslavia (and Albania).

SOUTHERN SLAVIC AND KOSOVAN EMIGRANTS AS AN INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEM OF THE DESTINATION STATES

It is well known that migrations have complex impacts on the emigration and immigration societies. On a purely demographic level they lead to changes in the ratio of men to women, to changes in the age structure, may influence the birth and death rates etc. (Salt and Clarke 2002). Also significant are economic, cultural, social, security etc. impacts – we can consider these to be direct.

The impact of migration on international relations is strong, even if only mediated – migrants are not creators of international relations or recognised subjects of international law, but are the object of the focused attention of the international community and also of a relatively intricate network of international and national legal acts.

It is naturally in the interest of partial members of the international community in relation to migrants, if we overlook the humanitarian aspects, to make best use of the benefits which migrants can bring for their state (professional skills, sustainability of system of inter-generational solidarity, cultural exchange), whilst averting the dangers in connection with their arrival (security, pathological manifestations).

Amongst the individual European states there is a different policy in relation to emigrants and refugees not only depending on historical traditions or the current number / proportions of foreign nationals, but also due to the influence of apprehensions with regard to security or particular political goals. As a result, in practice not only the initial procedure and degree of willingness to accept further refugees have differed, but also the approach to the length of their residence within the territory of the destination state and the details of their legal status. The policy applied towards immigrants and refugees has two fundamental aspects: immigration policy, i.e. measures regulating entry, the number and nature of immigrants, and integration policy, i.e. measures for incorporation of immigrants into the receiving society (Baršová and Barša 2005:35).

Immigration policy has the primary influence on international relations, whilst the impacts of integration policy are rather internal, and from this point of view it is also necessary to assess the impacts of a specific flow of migration or migrations from a specific territory on international relations.

Changes to the immigration policy of developed European countries with large communities of southern Slavs and Kosovan Albanians (this primarily concerns Germany, Austria and Switzerland), as well as to the character of immigration in the period following World War II, correspond to the general Western European trend, which is characterised by two significant reversals: the retreat from the model of hiring foreign manual workers in the period after 1973 and the emphatic tightening of asylum procedures as a response to the apparent abuse thereof after the end of the 1980s.

A further characteristic feature of the 1980s (i.e. before the crisis in Yugoslavia) was the dramatic politicisation of migration. Before this time cross-border migrations were not considered to be a serious political problem and there were also no tendencies to
view migrants as an a priori problem entity. Individual states created specialised authorities and institutions and applied a specific immigration policy according to individual legal categories of immigrants (refugees, migrant workers). In the 1980s a reversal took place and in Western European countries migration became a closely observed theme for politicians and the public alike (Castles and Miller 1998:9). The overall social climate was changing, Western countries were encountering mass unemployment, which mostly affected the low-skilled labour force and created animosity towards foreigners, who according to a part of the society and political spectrum “took jobs from the host population and took advantage of the social benefits of the host country” (Mesić 1988:375). The crisis of international refugee law, which can be described as mass abuse of the asylum system by economic migrants, a process which had become absolutely flagrant by the end of the 1980s, undoubtedly contributed to this situation. The result was partially that in the eyes of the public, differences between the individual categories of migrants were erased, and partially that an endeavour began on the part of the majority of destination countries to tighten asylum proceedings, in which some of these states in this endeavour breached the limits of the Geneva conventions, e.g. adherence to the conventions of guaranteed protection against forced repatriation is contentious (Mesić 1993:196).

An important moment for the perception of migrations in Western Europe was the political and social chaos accompanying the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, and – as was later demonstrated – the unjustified and somewhat hysterical fears of an enormous wave of refugees in an East-West direction, in connection with fears regarding the preservation of the cultural identity of Western civilisation as a whole—see e.g. the German concept of Völkerwanderung, evoking images of an invasion of tens of millions of modern Barbarians (Castles and Miller 1998:81). The wave of refugees from Yugoslavia and the genuinely barbaric circumstances which led to this movement perhaps played the greatest role in stoking these fears. It is paradoxical that the most highly developed post-communist countries shared similar fears – e.g. Slovenia and the Czech Republic (Erjavec 2003).

The European Union in particular, after the removal of internal borders, began and continues to devote considerable endeavours towards strengthening its external borders as prevention against the uncontrollable invasion of migrants from the east and south. After the ratification of the Schengen Agreement in 1985, a range of conferences were held and a range of treaties signed between Western European states, focusing on the technocratic improvement of migration controls (for a detailed view of the problem see e.g. Verlic Christensen 2002). Radical right wing groups successfully mobilised around the issue of immigrants and the envisaged threat to national identity in the 1990s, which helped shift the theme to the centre of the political stage. In addition to the very presence and motives of migrants, discussions also commenced regarding the “absorption capability” of the destination countries – at the beginning of the 1990s the number of foreign nationals legally resident in Western Europe exceeded the limit of 15 million, of whom only 1/3 were economically active, whilst the number of illegal immigrants resident in the same geographical area was estimated at 2.6 million (Salt 1993:15).

By the mid-1990s it had become evident that no extensive population shift from East to West would take place. The factors which led to this situation are summarised by Castles and Miller (1998:81):

a) control mechanisms introduced by Western countries,

b) economic and political stabilisation of Eastern Europe,

c) absence of informal social networks in destination states which could mediate work and accommodation for migrants (mainly in the case of Russians and Romanians).

As a consequence of political discussions, rational economic considerations and political pragmatism, there was a de facto acceptance of the immigration situation in the majority of Western European host countries, i.e. an acceptance that this represented a permanent process which was in many respects beneficial for the destination country (ageing population, insufficient labour force in certain sections of the labour market), which required regulation rather than restriction. The fundamental elements of
immigration policies in the 1990s became the social and economic (with discussion as to whether also cultural – from the perspective of Germany, compare e.g. Klusmeyer 2001) integration of foreign nationals, combined with restrictive immigration control (Bade 2005:336 interprets this as a populist concession to xenophobic movements and opinions). Perhaps we could state with a certain degree of hyperbole that the xenophobic conception of the immigrant as a parasite on the securities provided by the welfare state was displaced hand in hand with the change in immigration policies in the 1990s and replaced with an image of the immigrant as a necessary and “useful” contributor to prosperity. Forced migrants from crisis-hit areas in various parts of the world naturally do not conform so well to this model (impossibility of selection according to professional skills etc.), and a different policy is applied towards these migrants. Forced migration from the territory of former Yugoslavia perhaps contributed the most to the definition of this policy within the framework of Europe.

The influence of the migrations brought about by the crisis in Yugoslavia on the changes to European immigration policy is evident, even if the migration movements from the territory of Yugoslavia were only a partial component of a greater wave of migration caused by the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc (and in fact came late in comparison with the peak of the “Eastern wave”, see Figure 1).

The exceptional nature of the situation which occurred during the breakup of Yugoslavia confronted Europe with a problem which it had not encountered for a long period of time: total ethnic conflicts on the edge of the prospering core of the continent in connection with an enormous wave of refugees. The application of “strategies” of solutions to similar situations in the 1940s no longer came into consideration (development of international law; thanks to technological changes in transport and the practical temporal coincidence of the flight of refugees and their arrival in the destination country etc.). The solution to the political and humanitarian aspects of the crisis in Yugoslavia developed over time, oriented towards minimising the movement of refugees to third countries and of ensuring the fastest possible repatriation.

In the period from 1991-1993 mass waves of refugees were received and tolerated, but were granted only the status of temporary protection. In 1993 the majority of Western countries practically closed their borders to refugees from the territory of Yugoslavia and focused on ensuring that the refugees remained in safe zones within the geographical area of the conflict (Fassmann and Münz 1995:75). The strategy was progressively perfected, which is testified to also by the decreasing proportion of areas outside former Yugoslavia and Albania for receiving victims of the local conflicts: “non-Yugoslav” countries received more than 1/3 of refugees from the “Croatian” wave, even though half of this country was not affected by the conflict whatsoever, of the “Bosnian” wave this number was only 30%, despite the fact that the conflict and ethnic cleansing affected the entire territory of the state, of the “Kosovan” wave this proportion was 1/8 and of the “Macedonian” wave only an insignificant fraction. Another clear tendency is the growing cooperation of the international community in the “distribution” of refugees amongst the individual countries (and the thus reduced possibility of the free choice of the displaced person) – in all the waves Germany received the most refugees from non-former Yugoslavian countries, however within the framework of this group of countries it continually reduced its proportion (Germany received almost one half of the Croatian wave, but only 15% of the Kosovan wave).

A new paradigm for conflict resolution of the “Yugoslav type” thus gradually crystallised: political endeavours are directed towards ensuring the security of displaced persons directly on the site of the conflict or in the immediate surroundings thereof, and specific political solutions are also adapted to this goal, in particular with regard to speed and effectiveness (e.g. in the case of the Kosovo crisis). Precisely this fact – together with the changes to European migration policy – can be considered a primary consequence of the wave of migration brought about by the breakup of Yugoslavia.

8 For this consideration in all cases we reduce the numbers of internally displaced persons to those who originated from areas controlled by the “other side” after stabilisation of the front lines.
A further consequence is the chosen visa policy, which with regard to the region of former Yugoslavia is relatively consistent. In addition to a general endeavour to prevent the entry of persons with a security risk and undesirable economic migrations of persons with skills which are not usable within the destination countries (in particular from the poorer southern states of the “post-Yugoslavian” region with a certain tradition of illegal labour), there is an evident trend of attempting to prevent any mass population shifts, e.g. in any further applicable humanitarian crises. There is naturally a question as to the extent to which fears of this type are justified, i.e. whether the dangers of relaxing restrictions on the movement of persons are exaggerated, based on distorted conceptions which link a considerable proportion of migrants with organised crime or conceptions of their “cultural maladjustment”, or merely a response of politicians to a general mood within society, which with regard to its potential impact on electoral results cannot be ignored. In this respect it is of secondary importance as to whether or not these social attitudes are rational.

As has already been stated, from the 1980s onwards the issue of migration and integration of foreign nationals became highly politicised, at the centre of public attention and a popular theme of pre-election campaigns. During the course of the period under investigation (1990-2005) there is a perceptible shift in all the examined countries towards an acceptance of the fears of public opinion and its calls for greater “control” of migration. In Germany right-wing parties with anti-immigration rhetoric gained seats in a number of regional parliaments, in Austria the anti-immigration Freedom Party of Jörg Haider became a part of the governing coalition in the year 2000, and the popularity of extreme right-wing parties increased in Western European countries, such as the Flemish Bloc in Belgium, the Northern League in Italy, the Danish People's Party, the British National Party, the
Swedish Democrats, and mainstream parties of the right (for example the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which promotes stricter regulation of immigration, became the strongest Swiss political party for the first time in 2003) became increasingly vociferous in their opposition to economic immigration. The visa policy towards the poorer post-Yugoslav republics then appears as the simplest and most acceptable solution for the public, despite the fact that its effectiveness is disputable (the visa requirement presents practically no obstacle to organised crime, but adversely affects masses of tourists and traders and thus impedes cultural and economic exchange). Migrants from former Yugoslavia contributed to this situation mainly by means of their numbers and relative poverty, and not by their specific characteristics or by confronting the host states with entirely new types of problems. This fully applies also in the case of the Kosovan Albanians, who are the most closed and culturally different group amongst the migrants from former Yugoslavia, possibly also because the areas where they are most heavily concentrated had already undergone their first experiences with migrants from an entirely different culture previously.

SOUTHERN SLAVIC AND KOSOVAN MIGRANTS: A PROBLEM OR AN OPPORTUNITY FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA?

A consequence of the fact that the territory of Yugoslavia was for a long time a source region of extensive flows of immigration, instigated above all by the economically peripheral nature of the region and frequent changes in its political affiliation, was the establishment of large communities of immigrants from this region in various countries worldwide. The number of southern Slavic and Kosovan natives and their descendants living abroad who have retained entirely or in part their original ethnic identity and/or relations with their homeland or national culture was estimated in 1990, before the violent breakup of Yugoslavia, at 2.5 million (see Čizmić 1990:93), and today is most probably close to 3 million.

According to Gosar (1978:144) these immigrant communities can be divided into three different types:

- a) autochthonnous minorities in neighbouring states
- b) allochthounnous – temporary economic migrants
- c) allochthounnous – settled immigrants

The boundaries between groups b) and c) are not sharply defined, and in European countries it is practically impossible to separate them statistically. Diasporas most frequently organise themselves formally and informally on the basis of a shared time of arrival and shared motivation for migration, and we certainly cannot understand them as homogeneous formations, since they manifest similar social, political and world-view differentiation as in their parent countries. Whilst economic migrants as a rule are politically indifferent and do not have an a priori negative approach toward their country of origin or to other communities of migrants, the situation is fundamentally more complicated in the case of ethnic or political refugees. In this connection the relatively negative role of smaller but politically more active elements of Yugoslavian emigration is occasionally mentioned – refugees from the immediate post-war period. For decades these immigrants have remained linked to the militant nationalist ideologies of the fascist and nationalist movements of the 1930s and 1940s, and in the 1990s these groups shared in stirring up nationalist passions and financing nationalist political parties and insurgent groups in the disintegrating Yugoslavia. For example, Hockenos (2003) states that the Albanian, Croatian and Serbian diasporas rather fomented the conflicts and only rarely helped support democratic forces in their home countries. This influence is particularly visible in Croatia, or in the ambivalent relationship of the “home-grown” Croatian nationalist political representation to the historical legacy of the fascist Independent State of Croatia (NDH). Although the party has distanced itself from the NDH, it has adopted a whole range of its symbols and traditions. There is speculation that the main reason was an endeavour to neutralise the influence of Ustaša emigration on the Croatian extreme right and also to make use of its financial backing and political influence.

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9 It is not clear as to whether the author includes also the Kosovan Albanians, of whom almost 0.5 million were dwelling in Western European countries at this time – compare Laezko et al. (1999:55).
The effect of economic migrants on their homeland is of an entirely different character. In general it is possible to state that whilst the contact between settled emigrants and their homeland is mainly cultural and sometimes also of an ideological nature, economic migrants maintain far more complex political and economic ties with their homeland. The extent to which they share in the economy of their home states is large, making them a group whose opinions and interests must be constantly taken into account. A typical example in this respect is financial support for the families of emigrants – for example in 1999 it was estimated that the remittances of 500 thousand Kosovan Albanians (i.e. almost one quarter of the entire population) living and working in Western Europe secured up to 70% of economic activities within the region (Laczko et al. 1999:55).

In addition to the direct influence of migration from former Yugoslavia on the modifications of migration and asylum policy, it is not possible to overlook also those consequences for international relations which are indirect, i.e. not caused by the actual movement of migrants itself but ensuing from the residence of these migrants in the destination countries, or from their absence in their countries of origin. We could naturally also discuss the burden placed on international relations in certain cases by the cooling or in other cases outright hostility in the mutual relationships between the successor states of former Yugoslavia, but this case this concerns a cause rather than a consequence of migration.

A complicated “historical burden” on the mutual relationships between the nations of the Western Balkans is presented by the fact, which will have to be reckoned with at least in the medium-term perspective, that the images of refugees from the Knin region, the Srebrenica massacre or the violence in Kosovo have now become fully established in the historical memory of the affected nations. Unlike similar traumas which resulted from World War II, these were not artifically suppressed by a totalitarian ideology, but rather, within an immature democratic environment, became a populist tool in the arguments of politicians, and as a consequence are kept alive and in certain cases are periodically revived as a politically mobilising factor. In general it is possible to characterise the relationships of the southern Slavic nations and their nation states as ambivalent. As well as the negative experiences most frequently in connection with an endeavour to delineate a national territory and its ethnic homogenisation, there is also an indisputable linguistic and cultural similarity, and although this was disturbed in the 1990s there still remains a dense network of personal, professional and family ties, previous belonging to the same respected state entity, and furthermore there is also the similar temperament of the different nationalities.

It is evident that refugees and migrants from former Yugoslavia bring the above-outlined ambivalent feelings with them to their new places of residence, and this is manifested in their relationships towards other refugees or immigrants from the region, particularly in cases where they do not originate from the same ethnic group. Above all, populations which have endured forced migration retain feelings of trauma in connection with their geographical shift over long periods of time, and in their environment conserve the political culture and customs which are usual in their place of origin all the more strongly in the case of political migrants or migrants selected according to a political key (post-war migration waves of nationalistly oriented Croats and Slovenes), and this is stronger still in the case of populations which are closed and linguistically different in their new environment.

In practice the controversies between the individual groups of migrants from the region of former Yugoslavia have not been fatal and have not become a security risk for the countries of destination. The reasons why the fundamentally ethnic war from former Yugoslavia has not overflowed onto the streets of German or Austrian cities are clear: an entirely different legal environment, continuity of power and also the fact that southern Slavic communities had their basis in the economic migrations of the 1970s, which brought the generally positive experience of ethnic co-operation of the late Tito era to the new country. In addition, the mass waves of refugees were temporally limited and as a rule ethnically homogeneous, and were progressively
added to by economic migrants who evidently did not apply a nationalist perspective in their choice of countries of destination (e.g. it is not possible to map any correlation between the different attitudes of the individual Western countries to the solution of the crisis in Yugoslavia and the proportion of migrants according to the individual former Yugoslav republics).

In relation to the bilateral relationships between individual countries, the question arises as to whether the individual diasporas or groups of migrants could or can influence the international political positions of the host countries more actively, e.g. in the approach of these states to resolving the crisis in Yugoslavia. As we have already mentioned, the primary aim of the states intervening in the Yugoslav crisis, in addition to humanitarian motivations, was to deflect the waves of refugees coming to their countries. At the same time certain historical stereotypes were manifested and confederations of allies with the newly created states in the region were formed, most often according to the historical models of the 19th and early 20th century, i.e. on the basis of cultural similarity or traditional economic and political contacts (the pairing of Germany – Croatia, Serbia – Russia etc.). These relationships originated without any causal connection with the traditional southern Slavic communities in the destination states, and could at maximum have only been strengthened by them. More fundamental was the role of the new refugees, who naturally elicited sympathy in the third countries and became a significantly important factor in shaping public opinion. The evident solidarity of Germany and Austria with Croatia in 1991 had these roots.

Fugitives frequently became a passive political argument – either due to an endeavour to help victims or those who were perceived as victims, or due an endeavour to punish the offenders. The structure of fugitives and their distribution undoubtedly had a marked influence on the “distribution of sympathies” in the international community at the time of the crisis in Croatia: in 1991 sympathies lay clearly with Croatia, because there were far more of “its” fugitives in countries beyond former Yugoslavia than there were refugees of Serbian nationality, who did not go beyond the boundaries of former Yugoslavia. A similar effect occurred in the Bosnian and Kosovan crises. It is symptomatic that this one-sided view of Serbs as offenders and other nations as victims corrected itself over the course of time (under the impression of reports of the conduct of the non-Serbian victors of the war), and was also geographically distributed in a manner corresponding to the main concentrations of non-Serbian refugees (e.g. this was not manifested in China or Russia, who approached the crisis without this burden).

The displaced communities themselves may influence the foreign policy of the host countries only in mediated form (if we exclude lobbying, the effectiveness of which cannot be measured), most frequently by means of their influence on public opinion or their votes in the case that they are also part of the electorate. It is symptomatic that in issuing public statements, holding demonstrations and other events with the aim of influencing or informing the public they are mobilised far more by the threat of a deterioration of their own legal status in their country of residence than by any political decisions in relations to their home country (e.g. the campaign of the Albanians before the Swiss referendum on the tightening of the immigration prescriptions in 2006). In general it applies that their influence remains very limited in this respect: as a rule these communities lack the cohesion, political unity (with the exception of the Albanians) and the numbers in order to shape public opinion, and in addition these communities of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Kosovan origin are as a rule present in the same states at the same time, frequently without their varying origin and disparate view of the Yugoslavian problem going beyond the limits of the abilities of the majority society to differentiate.

It is paradoxical that displaced communities frequently have a fundamentally more “direct” influence on their home countries. Remittances from foreign migrant workers are economically very important for the region of former Yugoslavia. Whilst in general this source of finance is the second most important source after direct foreign investments in Central and Eastern Europe, in the case of the poorer countries of former Yugoslavia
this is the primary source. Remittances have a more than 5% share in the creation of GDP in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, official statistics are however underestimated because a part of the finances sent (resources sent in cash by informal channels) is not statistically identified. In Serbia and Montenegro these incomes correspond to half the volume of export, in Bosnia and Herzegovina they are in fact the same size as local export. The stated financial source is naturally highly desirable, because from a long-term perspective it supports the growth of the economy and also reduces the poverty of the lowest income groups within the population, and thus alleviates social tension (Mansoor and Quillin 2007:7). The need to preserve this source of income may naturally influence the decision-making sphere of the home countries with regard to foreign policy entirely fundamentally (promoting the interests of these groups of citizens on an international level has a direct economic effect for the country, which in some cases is irreplaceable). The interests of the home countries in this case rather diverge from the interests of the states of destination – the volume of remittances is thus (if somewhat simplified) directly dependent on the size of the foreign communities and indirectly dependent upon the degree of their integration within the country of residence.

OUTLINE OF FURTHER INFLUENCES OF MIGRATIONS AND MIGRANTS FROM FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The conflict in former Yugoslavia (and the migrations induced thereby) was given enormous attention by the international community, in particular by geographically close permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, United Kingdom, France, Russia) and Germany. The disproportionate relationship between the attention devoted to this conflict and the insufficient engagement with the conflicts simultaneously taking place in developing countries (Sudan, Rwanda), which were fundamentally more onerous from a humanitarian perspective, is significant. During the course of the conflict, the international community was represented predominantly by Western states, which in addition to diplomatic interventions also shared militarily in peacekeeping operations. Twice – in 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 1999 in Kosovo – these military interventions grew into independent “peace-making” military interventions. These events, organised under the auspices of NATO, relied in particular on the military forces of the USA and were in the form of aerial bombardments on the infrastructure of the enemy, whilst painstakingly avoiding the engagement of international units in direct land battles. The military interventions were officially motivated by moral impulses, and the operation in Kosovo was in fact directly referred to as humanitarian.

It is evident that the interventions from outside – mainly in 1999 – were intended to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. The endeavour to prevent a wave of refugees was one of the most important reasons for the intervention, and the military strategy was subject to this goal. This thesis is backed up by the actual course of the majority of the crisis, which was characterised by the initial passivity of the other European countries and their very reserved approach towards the use of force. This was not used until the moment when refugees were returning (Bosnia), or when it became necessary to prevent the migration of refugees from the region to third countries (Kosovo).

Both military interventions sparked discussions on the forms and limits of engagement in local conflicts, and this applies particularly with regard to the Kosovo crisis, in which the military actions were not approved by the UN and in the opinion of some were not conducted in accordance with international law. This fits in with the overall development of international relations during the period following the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, which is characterised by an erosion of trust (unfortunately completely justified) in the capability of the UN to act and a certain tendency to utilise mechanisms beyond the framework of this organisation, often in narrower or ad hoc created coalitions of countries under the leadership of the USA. Although the second alternative is more capable of acting in practice and enables a more rapid and effective response, it encounters a relatively large amount
of criticism and produces not entirely convincing results in the “peace phase” of the operation (the Iraqi quagmire). In the case of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the “will of the international community” was not represented by the UN, but rather by a “Contact Group”, originally an informal grouping of representatives of interested powers with an interest in the region\(^\text{10}\) – this represents an analogy of the situation in Europe following World War I, in which the key international decisions came in the form of an agreement between the victorious powers. In practice this group did not decide unanimously (in certain key decisions Russia did not provide its consent), and the role of the USA was strengthened within the framework of the group. It seems that this model of solving similar local conflicts has more or less proven itself, particularly thanks to its ability to minimise the time necessary for preparation for the intervention.

A relatively interesting “secondary product” of the crisis in Yugoslavia appears to be a confrontation of the nationalistic “world view” in the regions affected by the conflicts with the remainder of Europe, which subscribes – at least verbally – to civic principles. From the beginning in fact, neither of the parties was able or willing to accept this opposing point of view, which was manifested on the part of the European countries and the USA in their altogether ineffective appeals to civic principles and the institutions of a legal state from the initial stages of the conflict onwards, and on the other side with the quickly developed conviction that the West “didn’t understand” the situation in the region or that it would support the side in the conflict which nominally adapted to its “civil society” rhetoric (e.g. the emphasis on the “territorial principle” on the part of the Croatian nationalists or the declaration on a “multi-ethnic and multicultural” Bosnia on the part of the Bosnian nationalist representation). An accompanying manifestation then came in the mutually unexpected reactions, which from the perspective of one party or the other appeared to be irrational (e.g. the Western view of the “irrational” clinging of the Serbs to Kosovo).

\(^\text{10}\) This was formed by the USA, France, Great Britain and Russia as representatives of permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany with Italy with regard to their share in peacekeeping operations.

### CONCLUSION

The migrations within the framework of former Yugoslavia in the years 1990-2005 were predominantly forced and came about in connection with military conflict and mass violations of human rights. In addition to this, external migrations also had a strong economic motivation. Both types of migrations were directed primarily to countries with already existing southern Slavic or Kosovan communities, and the war deepened economic migrations still further (economic disruption and total collapse).

The migrating groups influenced public attitudes in the countries of destination, and in particular in the initial stages of the conflict contributed to the collective labelling of the Serbs as the clear guilty party in the war. The destination and potential destination countries progressively formulated a strategy of conflict resolution which resides in the strict time limitation of the residence of refugees (status of temporary protection) and is intended to prevent their permanent settlement: the political endeavour was directed towards ensuring the security of the displaced persons directly on the site of the conflict or in the immediate surroundings thereof, and specific political solutions are also adapted to this goal, in particular with regard to speed and effectiveness. Visa policy is also adapted towards this goal, and there is an evident trend to prevent any uncontrollable and unregulated mass migrations of population, e.g. in any potential further humanitarian crises.

The migrations deepened the decline of the region (economic losses, organised crime, propping up of authoritarian regimes) and also accelerated processes of urbanisation with a precipitous depopulation of rural areas, which deepens the decline of regions affected by migrations and makes them unattractive as areas to return to. All of these consequences represent a long-term competitive disadvantage for the affected regions.

Migrants from the territory of former Yugoslavia maintain an important status for the economy of the source (remittances) and destination (labour force) countries. It is in the interest of the source
countries to maintain the contacts of emigrants with their homeland (remittances, development of economic relations), with the potential of cultural and economic exchange.

Note:
The article takes as its source material the concluding report of the research project RM 02/25/05 Impacts of migration from the countries of former Yugoslavia to other European countries, financially supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, which was conducted in the years 2005-2007.

References


Migrace ze zemí bývalé Jugoslávie a její dopad na mezinárodní vztahy

Migrace v jugoslávském prostoru po roce 1990 byly převážně nucené a byly spojeny s válečným konfliktem a masovým porušováním lidských práv. Vnější migrace měly vedle toho i silnou ekonomickou motivaci. Oba typy migrací směřovaly primárně do zemí s již existujícími jihoslovanskými a kosovskými komunitami, ekonomické migrace válka ještě prohlušila (hospodářský rozvoj a celkový úpadek).

Migrace měly přirozeně na emigrační i imigrační společnost komplexní dopady – demografické, ekonomické, kulturní, společenské, bezpečnostní apod. – ty můžeme považovat za přímé. Dopad migrací na mezinárodní vztahy je silný, i když pouze zprostředkovaný. Na mezinárodní vztahy má primární vliv imigrační politika, z tohoto zorného úhlu je také třeba posuzovat dopady konkrétního migračního proudu, resp. migrací z konkrétního území na mezinárodní vztahy. V případě migrací z bývalé Jugoslávie je evidentní vliv migraci vyvolaných jugoslávskou krizí na změny v evropské imigrační politice v průběhu 90. let dvacátého století, i když migrační pohyby z jugoslávského prostoru byly jen dílčí složkou větší migrační vlny způsobené zhroucením východního bloku.