INTRODUCTION

The Balkan Peninsula is one of the largest physical geographical regions in Europe, whose northern borders are defined in different ways. The region is heterogeneous from a physical geographical aspect; all geographical features of Europe appear here. Nevertheless it is not geography from which aspect the region is most complicated. On the peninsula there has always coexisted a complicated mosaic of peoples, cultures, religions etc., therefore the intensity of historical events has always been high in this region (Hajdú et al. 2007).

Abstract

The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the formation of new states on the former territory of the SFRY affected not only the citizens of the former Yugoslavia, but also all states on the Balkan Peninsula. Greece had serious reservations over the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia. The collapse of the SFRY has also meant that in some Yugoslav successor states proportion of Albanian inhabitants has become significant and their economic and political importance has grown. Instead of former inner administrative borders, new state borders have been raised. Some of the new borders have turned into closed ones, and almost give the appearance of classical military borders. International borders and crossing facilities have divided special state units in the former unitary political geographical space. The most uncomfortable question within the “separation process” was: “Who has the right to self-determination?” Within the complicated political situations an ambition manifested itself that the “peoples”, the “nations”, the republics, “the majority settlement areas” have a right to and opportunity for self-determination.

The past two decades have brought basic changes in the whole Balkan Peninsula, especially on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, where spatial structures and settlement network were not devoid of changes either. Historical and political literature studying the single countries’ transformation is large and far reaching, however, urban network and spatial structure focused overview has been, so far, missing from the range of research.

Key words: former Yugoslavia, Western Balkans, political geography, nation states, urban network, urbanisation.

URBANISATION, STATE FORMATION PROCESSES AND NEW CAPITAL CITIES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

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INTRODUCTION

The different spatial categories (Balkans, Western Balkans, Southeast Europe, etc.) themselves are components of a historically conflict-laden process and the designated areas have specific meanings for almost everyone. Inner acceptance of the specifically defined territories was and still is problematic in most cases.

Historically one may distinguish a number of periods characterised by the formation of states (nation creating) both within Europe and also on the territory of the Balkan Peninsula. In the period of
European modernization, starting in 1789, we can speak about different waves of state-formation processes. The 19th and especially 20th century saw this nation- and state-creating process broadening further. A substantial majority of the states formed in the Balkans came into being in multi-ethnic, multi-faith, multi-lingual regions of multiple settlement structure.

From the end of the 1980s in Southern and Eastern Europe the unfolding processes may also be considered colourful. An ethnic element appeared, stated or not. The Balkan Peninsula both at the time of Cold War Era and at the time of the later co-existence of the bipolar world represented the whole of Europe in miniature. Prior to the radical transition in 1990, the Socialist and Western state systems existed over a relatively small territory. As well as the conservatively communist Bulgaria, the presence of non-aligned Yugoslavia, and the nationally communist Albania, there were two NATO members (Greece, Turkey), one of which was a European Community member (Greece).

Within the states of the Balkan Peninsula – first and foremost in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) – an unfolding process existed, resulting partly from external and partly from internal determining factors. How the former central (federal) political power, the member republics as well as the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Voivodina would settle their own ambitions within this process was a separate question.

The collapse of SFRY and the formation of the new states affected not only the citizens of former Yugoslavia, but also all the states on the Balkan Peninsula. It is no accident that Greece had serious concerns over the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia, since it saw the latter’s mere existence as a historical, political and national security threat. The breakdown of SFRY also fundamentally affected Albanians living in former Yugoslavia and Albania. It was evident that with the collapse of SFRY, in some Yugoslav successor states the significance of the proportion of Albanian inhabitants and their economic and political importance would grow. The Albanian settlement area – in part in its homogenous coverage – embraced a number of national border regions, especially in Macedonia, Serbia but in also Greece.

New state borders were erected in place of the old internal administrative borders. Some of the new state borders turned into closed ones, practically giving the appearance of classical military borders. International borders and crossing facilities divided special state units in the former unitary political geographical space.

The second question within the “separation process” was: “Who has the right to self-determination?” Within the complicated political situations (between 1991-1995, and in 2008) the ambition manifested itself that the “peoples”, the “nations”, the republics, “the majority settlement areas” all had a right to and opportunity for self-determination. Others considered that such ambitions only related to those areas which had previously also had their own constitutional mandate (republic level).

THE BREAK-UP OF MULTINATIONAL YUGOSLAVIA, THE FORMATION OF “NATION STATES”

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990 with its 255,804 km² territory and with 23.5 million inhabitants was a key element in its neighbourhood. The SFRY was a real multinational state (Table 1).

According to the political joke of the socialist period: “Yugoslavia has eight distinct peoples in six republics, and two provinces, with five languages, three religions, and two alphabets, but only one Yugoslav – Tito.”

According to the Constitution of 1974 the member republics possessed the right to secede from SFRY, the state incorporating this right in a desire to emphasise the democratic nature of the state system. (Stalin in 1937 also guaranteed this right when the Soviet constitution was being worked out.) However, the Yugoslav leaders did not seriously consider the possibility of separation in Yugoslavia, and as such they did not regulate the separation procedure.
Table 1 National Composition of Yugoslavia (in percent, except total).

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18,549,291</td>
<td>20,522,972</td>
<td>22,427,585</td>
<td>23,528,230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The SFRY was a federal state (with elements of confederation), but system of balances created by President Tito quickly weakened after his death in 1980.

In January 1991 the question at the level of the Yugoslav Presidency was whether the objective was the strengthening of the federation or progress toward confederation.

The collapse of SFRY (Figure 1) in the Yugoslav Wars (1991-1995), the formation of new states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia) and a special formation of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (after 2003 the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) not only affected the Southern Slavic peoples, but also every state on the Balkan Peninsula and all over Europe.

The concrete disintegration process of the federal state began in January 1991 with the crises and later by the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. It continued at constitutional level (the disfunctioning of the Yugoslav Presidency Council), and later at the level of the member republics. But gradually ambitions towards an independent statehood also emerged for the Autonomous Region of Kosovo, and areas settled by Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In this political situation the role and importance of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) increased considerably. The JNA nearly became the sole “legitimate Yugoslav structure”. (Members of the JNA took on oath on SFRY, and on Socialism.)

This short paper will not describe the process of separation but rather how the essence of the territorial content of the new system appeared within the territorial rearrangements and experiments, what kind of secession ambitions developed below the level of republics within the particular new states and how those problems pertaining to the settlements areas might be handled.

First state formations on the basis of federal republics

Slovenia was the westernmost, the most developed in economic terms, and almost nearly homogeneous republic in terms of ethnicity, language and faith. The referendum (held on 23 December 1990) supported the proclamation of independence, comprising 88.2% of those eligible to vote. The ten-day war against the JNA did not throw Slovenia into disorder, and the losses both in human and in collateral terms were small.
Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June 1991; the country’s new democratic constitution was adopted at the end of December 1991. In Slovenia, only a small number of Italian and Hungarian inhabitants were registered as native minorities. No secession movements appeared within either of these Hungarian and Italian settlement areas.

In Croatia, after a referendum of independence (19 May 1991), the Croatian Parliament announced the country’s independence on 25 June 1991. Parallel to it, the Parliament accepted a document with the title “Charter on Rights of Serbs and other Nationalities in the Republic of Croatia”. After two bloody wars (1991-1992, 1995) – which on the one hand were struggles between the JNA and the Croatian Police, and on the other between Croatian central power and “non legal” Serbian regional autonomies – Croatian territory was reintegrated in January 1998. After the victory, and in building a new nation state, Croatia did not wish to see any kind of formation that might possess meaningful national
territorial autonomy over its territory. The problems and resettlements of Serbian refugees (about 150,000) are one of the most serious questions in the EU accession process.

Macedonia – as opposed to the other former republics – split with Yugoslavia entirely peacefully, and celebrates 8 September 1991 as its Independence Day. The country is ethnically divided; besides the majority of Macedonians, Albanians constitute a significant minority and have settled in a territorially homogeneous fashion. In 1995, Greece announced an embargo against its new northern neighbour. The “name discussion” between the two countries is not just about the name of the new state, but first of all about its whole national and regional history, about heritage, about identity etc.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was the most multi-ethnic, multi-faithed republic in the former SFRY. Moreover, the ethnic groups lived side by side, partly in settlement area majority and partly in a mixed, mosaic configuration.

In October 1991 BiH declared its sovereignty, and at the same time Bosnian Serbs established the Bosnian Serb Assembly to represent their own settlement area and national interests. The Bosnian Croats also aspired to the announcement of the Herzegbosnian Croat Community, afterwards Republic.

The bloodiest and most complicated civil wars (Serb-Bosnian, Croat-Serb, Croat-Bosnian, Bosnian-Bosnian) took place in BiH (1992-1995), and the international community (and the NATO air force) intervened in the war to defend the Bosnian population.

The independent state of postwar BiH was formed (Dayton Peace Agreement, 1995) partly by the international community, and partly by the independent states of BiH, Croatia and Serbia, with the leadership of the three communities in the background. Fifteen years after Dayton we can say that BiH is “floating” as an international dominium, with inner political structures. Besides Kosovo, BiH is a real risk from the aspect of security of the Western Balkans.

The remaining territory functioned under the name of Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (after the 2003 Union of Serbia – Montenegro) and a peaceful chapter of the new Balkanization process has begun

In April 1992 it became clear to the former Yugoslav and Serb political and military elite that the Yugoslavia created by Tito would soon come to an end. First of all they wanted to save the name of “Yugoslavia”, and to form claims for a Yugoslav heritage.

Following Milosevic’s political downfall in October 2000 the pressure and opportunity to restart and reorganise manifested themselves. The Serb society despite the political rearrangements accepted neither the new confederation defined in the 2003 constitution easily, nor the right for Montenegro to decide on its separation by referendum after three years had elapsed.

The referendum took place on 21 May 2006, and with the peculiar validity threshold of 55% defined by the EU the Montenegrins expressed their lack of any real interest in a quick split.

Kosovo: the last one or just a next new state in the Balkanization process?

After the aerial war against Serbia (1999) and the political changes of 2000, discussions began on the future of Kosovo at the international level. It was clear to everyone that the Kosovo question was crucial not just within the context of the Balkans, but also regarding the final solution to this question; its method and results would be an example for all regions of a similar nature and in a similar situation, not to mention the fact that it may set processes in motion for the creation of new states all over the World.

In spite of UN Resolution 1244, Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008. After Kosovo’s declaration of independence the “most exigent question” of the Western Balkans (and in a wider context also) turned out to be the diplomatic recognition of Kosovo. For Serbia, and for
different reasons for Bosnia and Herzegovina, this question is a basic political, strategic problem. In part, the question is partly dividing the European Union itself, because some member states have special fears emanating from the “non precedent” situation.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE URBAN NETWORK

The past two decades have brought basic changes in the whole Balkan Peninsula, especially on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, where spatial structures and settlement network were not devoid of changes either (Petrakos and Economou 2002; Dimou and Schaffar 2009). War destruction (Coward 2004; Graham 2004; Riedelmayer 2002; Nation 2003) affected the transformation of regions and towns just like changes of demographic, migration and ethnic circumstances (Hammel 1993; Ramet 2005, 2006; Đurđev et al. 2009). Due to the change of the economic, political and social regime and the new borders spatial structures became differentiated along new factors (Kočić-Pavlaković and Pejnović 2005; Zeković 2009). Cooperation programs of the Euro-Atlantic integration hold many new challenges and opportunities (BBR 2006; ÖIR 2006; RePUS 2007; Papadaskalopoulos et al. 2005).

To be able to understand the present town network and feature potential development directions we need to get acquainted with its genesis. Three main factor groups have influenced the formation of the town system: physical geographical conditions, prevalent changes of state borders and ethnical-cultural divergences.

Natural features have facilitated, or in other cases blocked, inter-settlement interaction. The Dinaric Alps hampers links between the coast and the northern territories, whilst the Adriatic has almost pre-ordained relationships among the coastal settlements and maritime trade. Mountain valleys, safe harbours along the coast are, necessarily, meeting points of socio-economic relationships, and this meant advantageous local conditions for town development. However, those coastal settlements, which were located on a road or on a railway saw their networks maintain their good development potential. Among the towns on the mainland located in valleys, it was mainly those situated at the junction of several roads which were able to maintain their positions over time. The Danube and its tributaries, as well as the roads running parallel with these, had facilitated the formation of towns. Securing access to the sea and the development of a national port was a crucial consideration in the new Yugoslavian states.

Changes of regime, the influence of other cultures, as well as their diverse usage of space impacted on towns and their relationships in different ways. As is widely known, the Western Balkans’ ethnic and regional composition is very diverse; its level of multiculturalism is unique in Europe. Different types of towns were formed in the different cultural zones of the Balkans.

Urbanization and city growth in the Balkans

Urbanization was late on the Balkans and it has leeway even in comparison with Central Europe, the Balkan’s town network was less dense. Urbanization level of the Western Balkans is still under the European average; it is related to the general underdevelopment based on historic reasons. The fact, that no such city was formed, that could have had durable and significant influence on the whole region is another specificity of the region. Socialist industrialization, establishment of new factories and other projects linked to
these accelerated migration. Population growth and change of the settlements’ character were followed by the change of administrative classifications.

The development of Belgrade, the capital, was not disproportionate in multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. The centres of other regions (Zagreb, Ljubljana etc.) were also developing, and so the urban network was relatively in proportion. Every part of the country or region had its own centre. This was true of both the proportion of small, medium and large towns as well as for the network’s geographical location. Belgrade’s growth declined by virtue of the fact that the country’s government was decentralised in several respects.

Migration stopped in the 1990s, and in some places, its direction changed as well. Industrial jobs disappeared and so many who had found themselves in a hostile ethnic environment moved back to their former homes which ensured both ethnic security and a livelihood. Not only was internal migration significant, but many town-dwellers left the area and moved abroad.

In spite of perpetual urbanization Yugoslavia was lagging behind the European average urbanization level even before its breakup, and its different parts, later on, the different member states were urbanized on very different levels. The Yugoslav wars meant a breaking point for several towns. Towns were devastated and abandoned; a significant ethnical migration took place. Urbanization did not keep its former pace of growth in the successor states; a few new town statuses were granted based on administrative concerns, mainly because the former centres got to other states.

After the break-up of Yugoslavia, the new countries aimed principally at strengthening their integrated state territory and establishing their own administration. This meant the development of national capital cities (Figure 2) and new administrative centres. The population growth in the capitals changed the formal ethnic proportions, that of the majority nation being increased. Political change had also changed the status of several settlements in the settlement network.
The recently created nation states consider developing their capital cities and town network as a top priority. These efforts are banned by several problems. Natural population growth is low in towns (except the Albanian cities), and so any increase can only result from migration. It is difficult to trace migration, since many consider the move as temporary and do not register at their new domicile. Ethnic conflict produced ethnic segregation in many multi-ethnic towns. Beside ethnic segregation, property-based segregation has also increased.

**Albania**

From the urbanization perspective, Albania is unique in the region. In Europe’s most rural country, where 58% of all employees worked in the primary sector in 2006, migration to towns was hindered by administrative barriers before the change of regime. The possibility of moving to towns in the 1990s, along with, in the European context, the extraordinary natural birth rate caused an increase in growth of the urban population (Figure 2), which was accompanied by significant migration trends. Because of jobs offered by industry, commerce and tourism, and also because of better living conditions, migration from the higher territories to the capital, to coastal towns and abroad was significant. Based on the calculations of Gëdeshi and Gjokuta (2008) nearly 1 million people (25% of the population, 35% of manpower) have left Albania since the change of regime. More than three-quarters of the migrant population chose the area of Tirana and Durrës for a new home. 41.8% of Albania’s population currently lives in this region. The primacy of the capital, whose population exceeds 500,000, follows from all significant development indicators. Considering its dynamics, Tirana’s weight within the country is becoming more and more crucial. The territorially concentrated and uncontrolled urbanization process is having adverse effects on nature and the living standards of towns, since it is not accompanied by appropriate infrastructure and service development. Further, housing and employment development are also lagging behind the rate of growth of the urban population. Considering the consequences (e.g. the deteriorating health of migrants, increasing illiteracy) the economic and social costs of rapid Albanian urbanization are steadily increasing (Human Development Promotion Centre 2002). The number of illegally built houses is very significant. In spite of all this negative experience, spontaneous and chaotic urbanization is a necessary concomitant of Albania’s development, which has positive effects, too. With these problems, however, appropriate handling and planning are extremely urgent.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The geographically divided space favoured autonomous regional development and the establishment of a territorially balanced town network. This polycentric network based on the territorial division of work was torn apart by the Yugoslavian war. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the Western Balkan state that suffered the most from its split from Yugoslavia; here the war lasted longest and had its most casualties. The areas of mixed population and the larger towns suffered especially. Large towns and their districts had, ethnically, been the most heterogeneous territories within the Yugoslav republic. In such areas were found the highest proportions of Yugoslavs and children born from mixed marriages. These towns were examples of tolerance, peaceful cohabitation and multiculturalism. Their symbols (buildings, common spaces) became targets for destruction aiming at nationalization and ethnic homogenization. The tragic war changed fundamentally the country’s ethnic and demographic constitution, from both a quantitative and a territorial perspective. The settlement network was mostly damaged after the war.

As a result of the multifactor compromise which ended the war, a state was established which was, formally, unified, although with numerous internal divisions. The peace affected the settlement network fundamentally. The main effect of the political settlement was shown by the new borders to catchment areas. The inter-entity boundary (IEBL) divided the territories of 28 communities (among these were the cities of Sarajevo and Mostar). Using these boundaries, the catchment areas of regional centres (most importantly of Sarajevo, Mostar and...
Tuzla) were substantially reduced. The situation of those territories which lost their centres was in many cases disadvantageous in that they became peripheral. Such territories are where smaller settlements will take over central functions.

Several settlements which formerly exercised no administrative function or whose significance had not been so great have risen in the hierarchy as a secondary effect of the new administrative system. These will include Sarajevo (as the new state capital and the capital of two entities at the same time), the de facto Serb ethnic centre Banja Luka and the seats of cantons. The “Special Status town” of Brčko can also be counted among these.

Sarajevo became a true European capital (with all its positive features) in spite of the fact that Sarajevo’s population had significantly decreased (Figure 2) due to the near-four-year blockade and siege, that its economy had been, to all intents and purposes, wiped out and that it had lost a part of its catchment area and its eastern territories. Its powers are, nevertheless, limited, since it cannot affect the activity of the Serbian ethnic group. Banja Luka is the decision-making centre of the Serb Republic and is a significant economic, financial, cultural and educational centre. Its catchment area has changed to some degree, but, since it was away from the front-line and in view of its new administrative functions, it is indisputably a winner in the territorial processes.
Serbia

The Western Balkan’s largest and most populous country extends from the southeast of the Pannonian Plain to the centre of the Balkans. The area has geo-strategic importance, since the routes crossing the country link Western and Central Europe to the Balkans and the Middle East. One positive output of this location is the central territory’s (the node cities’) spatial organizer-transmitter role. The country’s direction over the last twenty years has been very specific. Due to the isolation in the 1990s, its integration into global processes was somewhat slow. The effects of the lost wars and the transformation of the economy emerged, with varying intensity across the country and also in the urban network (Zeković 2009). After the break-up of Yugoslavia, hundreds of thousands of Serbian families moved from the new states to the mother country. These waves of refugees were territorially uneven, since they were generally concentrated in those towns and cities close to the areas affected by hostilities. Nonetheless, and in spite of migration, Serbia’s population decreased by 3% between 1991
and 2008. The population only grew in four districts: the highest (a near 10% increase) was seen on the Belgrade-Noví Sad (North Bačka, Srem) axis.

A transformed and revived Belgrade is, from every perspective, at the peak of Serbia’s urban network. The former Yugoslavian capital’s administrative and economic functions were significantly narrowed by the fact that nearly 70% of the country’s population and territory left its control within a period of 20 years. After a sharp drop in the 1990s the local economy had stabilized by 2003. Belgrade’s capacities are, in every single respect, too big for the current size of the state. 1.6 million people live in the agglomeration of a metropolis of 1.1 million, which lies at the crossroads of the most important routes. Medium-sized towns such as Pančevo or Smederevo also belong to its catchment area (Tošić and Đorđević 2004). As a consequence of the post-industrial transition and nearly 100,000 refugees, the city has to face a general decline in industry and specific urban problems – illegal building, suburbanization within the city limits (Hirt 2009).

Urban network and expected trends

Urban network of the Western Balkans (Figure 3) might take a new direction in the light of European integration. Towns, regions of bigger cities and coastal settlements having more attractive features are the target for migration. The development of state and administrative functions can be expected in the new administrative capitals; this induces further development. There are ethnic centres, which play a significant role in the ethnicity based development policy.

Regions of Beograd and Zagreb, as potential Metropolitan Growth Areas emerge from the urban network, and they might provide services for the whole Western Balkans or a part of it. Capital cities will grow, their central functions will become more complex. The development of Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Podgorica, Skopje and Tirana will be faster than in the rest of the countries (Figure 4).

There are regional centres of true national significance in Croatia and Serbia that provide services for parts of the countries and regions. Such regional centres are Osijek, Rijeka and Split in Croatia, Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Niš and perhaps Subotica as well in Serbia. Banja Luka, as the centre of the Bosnian Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina emerges from the other regional centres to a second capital city for the Serbs. Tuzla, Mostar and Zenica have lost part of their former catchment areas, however, they might obtain a regional centre role in a NUTS2 structure. Centres of smaller spatial units might provide services in respect of their catchment areas. Their development will be in line with the basic interest of their regions. Basic towns integrate a few surrounding settlements and will provide town-level services for them.

CONCLUSIONS

The external environment of the systemic changes taking place in the Balkan Peninsula and of the transformation of the national-territorial structures was the transition of different value systems: global, inter-systemic (socialist – capitalism), superpower (American – Soviet) and Western value systems (NATO, Warsaw Pact, European Union). Parallel to the collapse of the socialist world system and the elimination of the bipolar system of the world, fundamental transitions began to get under way in the political systems of all ex-socialist countries. The reunification of German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany, the structural crisis of the Soviet Union and then its disintegration at Christmas 1991, as well as the peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993, all demonstrated these fundamental rearrangements.

The initial positions were, of course, strikingly different from the further development processes in the respective countries. The earlier created and experienced internal structures and the way of transition had a considerable impact on the progress of the ensuing processes. The internal process of transition determined to a great extent how the respective countries were able to integrate themselves into the new international and European order. The inner structures of the individual states were significantly influenced by the EU’s system of relations (the preparation and then accession of some countries in 2004). The need for harmonisation of different structures naturally emerged.
Systemic changes of the socialist states of the Balkan Peninsula are in line with the major tendencies. Rearrangements between 1989-1991 took place in at least three different ways (negotiations; smaller or greater opposition, social conflicts; and finally in tragic civil war).

Countries of the Balkan Peninsula (the “decent” socialist countries, the non-aligned socialist Yugoslavia, the socialist Albania with its own way and the two capitalist countries) experienced historical development processes that were similar in several aspects, but also very complicated and very much different and in some other ways. By the end of the cold war period it was rather heterogeneity than homogeneity that became a typical development characteristic and result in the countries of the Balkans. The respective countries of the region arrived at the starting line of the “new world order” with a variety of historical heritages and specific economic, social and political experience.

The large-scale rearrangement of national territories taking place in this region was thus not a “Balkan feature”, not a peculiar and unique phenomenon in this period, but in civil war circumstances it did possess had individual and unique characteristics.

The social, economic and political systemic changes occurring in the Balkan Peninsula necessarily and fundamentally concerned the issue of Yugoslavia and related to Yugoslavia and almost all neighbouring countries in some way. The crisis of Yugoslavia, a country with large territory and population, a country that was actually a regional power with a leading role among the non-aligned countries, generated spillover effects.

There were also considerable differences across the respective states as regards whether radical transformation took place within the “old national frameworks” (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania), whether new states were born. In the newly created states (which make up the majority in the region in question) the issues coming from the disintegration of the old state structures and the problems of the new arrangements of the state had to be handled simultaneously. During the state formation, new nation and state concepts were made, new capital cities were designated and the relation of the new elites to the territory of the state also changed.

The historical, political and other specialist literature on the transition of the respective countries is huge and diverse. Research carried out within national frameworks has explored almost all aspects of the processes of the given states. In addition to national surveys, transition processes have also been analysed comparatively. The issues of the development of the macro-region have been monitored by a large number of internal and external institutions and networks. Correlations of state-building and administrative systemic changes, democratisation, decentralisation and regionalisation, among other things, have continuously appeared in analyses.

In the Yugoslav area, systemic change coincided with the strengthening of nationalism, as both the old and the new political elite expected to find their “real” roots in this nationalism, which became a political “calling” for a while. The need for handling the issue of multi-ethnicity arose during the working out of the new constitutional arrangement and also with the creation of the administrative systems and spatial divisions. The new state majorities were usually unwilling to offer territorial autonomy to ethnic minority areas. The approach to the ethnic minority areas has become a significant and peculiar issue of decentralisation and regionalisation.

References


Urbanisation, state formation processes and new capital cities in the Western Balkans


Résumé

Urbanizace, procesy formování států a nová hlavní města západního Balkánu


V jugoslávské oblasti byla změna systému doprovázena silícím nacionalismem, kdy jak nové tak staré elity hledaly v tomto nacionalismu své „oprávdivé“ kořeny, což se na chvíli stalo politickou nutností. Potřeba řešení multi-etnických záležitostí vyvstala během vzniku nového ústavního a administrativního uspořádání a prostorového členění. Nové majority obvykle nechtěly menšinám nabídnout územní autonomii. Přístup k minoritám se tak stal významným tématem decentralizace a regionalizace.

Poslední dvě dekády přinesly na Balkánský poloostrov, především na území bývalé Jugoslávie, jež se také nevyhnulo změnám v prostorové struktuře a systému osídlení, základním proměnám. Válečné škody ovšem způsobily transformaci regionů a měst ve smyslu demografickém, migračním a etnickém. Kvůli změnám ekonomického, politického a společenského režimu a vzniku nových hranic byly prostorové změny určovány novými faktory. Abychom porozuměli sousedně síti měst a následně potenciální směry rozvoje, musíme pochopit její vznik. Tři hlavní skupiny faktorů ovšem utvářely systému měst: fyzicko geografické podmínky, převládající změny státních hranic a etnicko-kulturní divergence.

Urbanizace proběhla na Balkáně pozdě a má své rezervy i ve srovnání se střední Evropou, sítě balkánských měst není tak hustá. Dalším specifikou regionu je fakt, že tu nevzniklo žádné město, které by mělo trvalý a významný vliv na celý region. Sociální a etická industrializace, zakládání nových továren a další projekty akcentovaly migraci. Populační růst a změny charakteru osídlení byly následovány změnami administrativního uspořádání.

Migrace ustaly v 90. letech dvacátého století, v některých případech se změnil jejich směr. Pracovní místa v průmyslu přestala existovat a množí lidé se z důvodu neprávě národnostního průstřelého vracet do svých domovů, kde hledali bezpečí a obživu. Množí lidé rovněž zcela opustili

Po rozpadu Jugoslávie se nové státy primárně zaměřily na posílení integrace státního území a na ustanovení vlastní administrativy. To znamenalo rozvoj národních hlavních měst a nových administrativních center. Populační růst hlavních měst způsobil změny v etnické struktuře, ve prospěch národních většin. Politické změny také přinesly některým městům nový statut.

Nově vzniklé národní státy považovaly rozvoj hlavních měst a sítě měst za hlavní prioritu. Tyto snahy byly narušovány několika faktory. Přirozená míra obyvatelstva je nízká (s výjimkou albánských měst) a růst může být tedy způsoben pouze migrací. Zachytit migraci je obtížné, neboť mnozí považují své původy pouze za dočasné a nejsou tedy registrováni. Etnický konflikt způsobil v mnoha etnicky šesti městech etnickou segregaci. Objevila se rovněž majetková segregace.

Urbánní síť západního Balkánu může přinést nové směry ve světle evropské integrace. Města, regiony, větší města a příbřežní osídlení jsou cílem migrací. Rozvoj státních a administrativních funkcí může být očekáván v nových hlavních městech, což produkce další rozvoj. Existují etnická centra, která hrají důležitou roli v rozvojové politice založené na etniku.