

## UNRECOGNISED STATE ENTITIES – EVALUATION OF EMERGING STATES IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

Štěpán Podhřázký

Department of Geography, Faculty of Science, Masaryk University,  
Kotlářská 2, 611 37 Brno, Czech Republic, s.podhrazsky@mail.muni.cz

### Abstract

Since the end of World War II, the international community has observed the principle of territorial integrity. Beyond the context of decolonization, it categorically refuses to grant the sovereignty to any entity created by the secession process without the approval of the central government of the parental state. Doubting the principle of territorial integrity would call into question the legitimacy of the global political system as we know it. Legitimately, an infinite number of entities would be created to join or divide according to the current situation and needs. From the point of view of the established international order, it would be an unpredictable chaotic state. The negative approach of the international community to any changes and secessionist efforts, in particular, is a natural consequence. Yet the emergence of new entities striving to gain state status cannot be avoided. Although these so-called “unrecognized state entities” often show greater functionality than the original sovereign, they cannot gain the support of the international community and thus they are getting into a political vacuum. The aim of this paper is to qualitatively analyze and terminologically integrate unrecognized state entities and thereby provide basis for solving their unsatisfactory status in politico-geographic space.

**Key words:** political geography, unrecognized states entities, quasi-states, evaluation criteria

### INTRODUCTION

The amount of terms denoting territorial units with attributes without international recognition is large and persistently increasing. Existence of terms like unrecognized states, de facto states, pseudo-states, state like entities, states within states, contested states, and even wannabe states (Anderson 2012: 183), only supports that statement. The only thing that the enumerated terms reflect is the end of simple perception of the world. The world is no longer seen as divided into recognized and territory-defined nation states, which in reality has never been the case, and previously unidentified entities existing in political space. Although it is often assumed that unrecognized states are products of

a new geopolitical cycle, which started after World War II, they have existed since the emergence of modern state systems. What differentiates the contemporary unrecognized states from their historical predecessors is the unwillingness of the international community of states to accept new members, as McGarry et al. (2004: ix–xi) state: ‘The bias against political divorce, that is, secession, is just about as strong as the nineteenth-century bias against marital divorce’.

He highlighted the endeavour of the world community to keep the status quo after World War II. Apart from new states created by the process of decolonization and recognized successor states collapsed communist federations (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia)

only five states succeeded in gaining independence from their former sovereign fully acknowledged by the international community – Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea, Montenegro and South Sudan. Geldenhuys (2009) links this phenomenon with the general assumption that secession of territory is a negative one. And this is what puts contemporary unrecognized state entities into complicated political situation. Most of them are products of efforts of secession from internationally recognized states which doesn't improve their chances to be accepted to the exclusive 'club' of recognized states. It is necessary to ask the question whether there is an alternative. Many unrecognized states were created due to repression (physical and/or perceived) by their former sovereigns. Reunification is, if not outright impossible, at least immensely difficult. Without the possibility of independence and reunification the unrecognized states get into insoluble situation.

Functioning but formally unaccepted territorial units are for the purpose of this article labelled as 'unrecognized state entities'. On the contrary non-functioning but formally recognized territorial units are labelled 'deviant states'. The reasons for this labelling are introduced later in this work, following the sections on contemporary literature and evaluation of leading approaches of individual authors, that are 'de facto state' (Pegg 1998; Lynch 2004; Bartmann 2004; Caspersen 2009; Berg and Toomla 2009), 'pseudo-state' (Kolossoff and O'Loughlin 1999; Kolossoff 2001), 'statelike entity' (King 2001), 'states within states' (Kingston 2004; Spears 2004; Stanislawski 2008), 'quasi-state' (Kolstø 2006) and 'unrecognized states' (Caspersen 2012).

In present-day works the case studies approach is used most frequently when dealing with unrecognized state entities. This article takes a different approach. Firstly it points out the complicated terminology and introduces an alternative term grasping the nature of functional but formally unrecognized territorial units. Secondly the article deals with criteria that enable quantitative methods to be used with the help of key attributes created on the basis of analysis of contemporary literature with practicality and functionality taken into account. The results are: a possibility of comparing entities of interest

with each other, providing relevant materials, and contributing to discussion about granting the sovereignty status at least to some of these entities. The article is focused on entities of interest occurring in the political space after 2000 only, although a number of them gained significance in 90's. The reason for this timeframe is the gradual change in perception of deviant states and eventually unrecognized state entities by global and regional powers at the turn of the millennium. Different perception was caused by a change of geopolitical cycle in the name of war on terror and deviant states, on whose territory unrecognized state entities can be found the most frequently, have become the potential source of terrorism, hence becoming the core of world events.

## **PRESENT DAY TERMINOLOGY**

The work of Scott Pegg International Society and the De facto state on the topic of unrecognized states became classics in 1998. Pegg (1998) labelled the unrecognized states by the term *de facto* states and discerned them from other dependent entities located in the political space on the basis of fulfilling the defined criteria and used traits to differentiate them from each other. Although the work itself is 20 years old, it contains important knowledge many authors of today build upon. For that reason it is a foundation for this article as well.

*De facto* states are, according to Pegg, characteristic by having a certain level of organized political leadership by the local population and by providing the population with basic state services (Pegg 1998). However, Pegg didn't specify the extent of their fulfilment, which has left it impossible to evaluate. The third characteristics of *de facto* states should have been their ability to establish relations with another state. This ability is more of a theoretical one as they remain unrecognized by the international community, which Pegg was pointing out. The last criteria became the minimal duration of existence of at least 2 years and an ability to achieve none or minimal international recognition, which was also worked on by plethora of authors, noted below.

In 2004 Lynch in his work continued where Pegg (1998) had left and divided the concept of *de facto*

states into juridical and empirical notions. According to his work *de facto* states lack the juridical notions, which make their territory claims groundless, but they possess the empirical notions. Using the same logic Lynch (2004) has divided the sovereignty to internal and external. Putting Pegg's work into this analytical framework leads us to a conclusion that *de facto* states fully possess the internal sovereignty but lack the external one. *De facto* states also pursue their independence, which is typical for them, Lynch notes.

In 2004 Barry Bartmann, on the matter of unrecognized state entities and deviant states quite accurately stated: 'In some cases, recognition (...of the states...) is granted readily or, more typically, persistently maintained in spite of conditions on the ground which are tantamount to legal fiction. In other cases, recognition is stubbornly withheld even though the realities on the ground themselves expose the legal fictions which the international community supports in the defence of the principle of territorial integrity' (Bartmann 2004: 12). In his idea of *de facto* states he differentiated the juridical and empirical statehood similarly to Lynch (2004). According to Bartmann (2004) the unrecognized states are illegal in the eyes of international community and organizations, even though they have the support of local population and are able to perform acts reserved only for states. The perception of empirical and juridical dichotomy has become common when defining unrecognized states, as works of Caspersen (2009) and Berg and Toomla (2009) and many others show.

On the other hand, Geldenhuys (2009) was critical about the idea of *de facto* states. He criticised it mainly because of its inability to reflect the extent of *de jure* recognition and its assumption that *de facto* states obtain no recognition, which does not have to be true. An example of this is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which has not gained any notable international recognition, but it has support of the Republic of Turkey. On the contrary Geldenhuys acknowledges the UN membership as the highest achievable affirmation of state recognition, and no *de facto* state is a UN member.

Kolossov (2001) as well as Kolossov and O'Loughlin (1999) contributed to the field, who introduced new term pseudostates. The key features in their concept are the declaration of independence, fulfilling the empirical statehood while lacking international recognition, and a conflict that had led to the creation of pseudostates and remains unresolved so far. Kolossov and O'Loughlin (1999) also used the term quasi-state in their work, but they understand it completely differently from both Jackson (1993) and Kolstø (2006), whose approaches are presented below. Their definition of quasi-states is uncommon and is focused on areas with no central control not trying to gain independence. Most often is a result of coordinated criminal activities which can be present even on urban areas of the Western world.

In his analysis of *de facto* states in Eurasian region King (2001) came to a remarkable finding. The separatist entities of early 90's have transformed into state-forming entities in just a decade, even though the conflicts that led to their emergence remain unresolved. In his work King did not try to conceptualize this phenomenon, he focused on particular state-forming entities in post-Soviet region – Nagorno-Karabakh, Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Transnistria), South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Chechnya and Tajikistan. To evade the criticism of lack of defining his selection of entities of interest he provided vague definition in footnotes (King 2001: 525). To define so-called state like entities he used the standard dichotomy of empirical and juridical statehood. According to King (2001: 525) state like entities possess the population and functioning government over the claimed territory but lack the international recognition. Even though King used mostly the term state like entities, he didn't evade using others like unrecognized state, *de facto* country (King 2001: 525) and even quasi-state (King 2001: 528). His work is beneficial especially because he points out the difficulty of any conceptualization of unrecognized states and necessary caution when setting the empirical criteria of unrecognized states. State-within-state, as Kingston (2004) and Spears (2004) use it, is a term that denotes wider range of entities than previously presented term *de facto*

state. Majority of states-within-states introduced by Kingston (2004: 7) 'exhibit severe imbalances in their institutional development'. The overall emphasis is laid rather on non-functioning states and entities present in their territory than on entities trying to gain independence. Most entities considered don't possess the characteristics of a state as Weber defines it, namely the monopoly of legitimate violence. It is clear then that just a portion of entities falling into Kingston's category of states-within-states can be included in the category of unrecognized state entities.

Spears (2004) who disagrees with Kingston (2004) in some aspects, commented on the topic in the same work. In his point of view states-within-states are able to exert power over claimed territory and fulfil Weber's criteria of statehood. The way Spears (2004: 16) uses the traditional juridical and empirical dichotomy to differentiate states-within-states and quasi-states is important. He sees quasi-states in a similar way as Jackson (1993) only as empty shells with low functionality or none at all. States-within-states are the exact opposite – 'have imposed effective control over a territory within a larger state', as Spears (2004: 16) states. This functionality is exhibited by the ability to collect taxes and to provide the population with basic services. Nonetheless they are still seen as political sub-entities by the prism of juridical statehood (Spears 2004) without international recognition.

The duration of existence is important for Spears, but he sees it completely differently from Pegg (1998) and he uses a principle of temporariness instead of minimal duration of existence. States-within-states are considered to be just a temporary phenomenon (Spears 2004) in political space.

Stanislawski (2008: 371) tackled the states-within-states idea completely in a different way defining them as 'regions that formally recognize the central government but in fact maintain a very high degree of independence'. This approach is an outright opposite of Spears and Pegg's, who assume the conflict with the central government. This is connected to the unrecognized states' aims. While Pegg and Spears assume one of the aims is to gain

independence, entities acknowledging the central government don't seek independence. The last difference is the external sovereignty. According to Stanislawski (2008) unrecognized states possess external sovereignty in the form of the sovereignty of the central government.

Kolstø (2006) used the term quasi-state for unrecognized states, even though the term was being used in reverse before – for deviant states (Jackson 1993). Yet Kolstø (2006) used the term quasi-state, because similarly to Jackson (1993) he doesn't presuppose a high level of functionality, although it can appear as functioning in relation to the original sovereign. In case of recognition as a sovereign state nothing changes as far as internal functionality is concerned. As international community sees it only a new non-functioning state is formed, Jackson's quasi-state.

So as to avoid complete confusion of terms, Kolstø suggested terms failed states for non-functioning states and quasi-state remained to be used for unrecognized states (Kolstø 2006).

Unrecognized state is probably the most commonly used term denoting an entity internally functioning but unrecognized by international community. It was used by Caspersen (2012), whose definition was similar to Pegg's. That demonstrates the timelessness of his work. Caspersen presupposes the creation of own leadership, factual independence of unrecognized states, at least two years of existence and an ability to exert power over 2/3 of claimed territory. Main Caspersen's contribution to the topic of unrecognized state entities is her approach to international recognition. It is clear that these entities would lack international recognition as their nature dictates, however on the other hand, a guarantee of their existence by the regional or global power, or support from several 'insignificant' states also cannot be completely ruled out (Caspersen 2012). Unfortunately, she does not define the term 'insignificant'.

Caspersen (2012) does not tackle unrecognized states on a case by case basis, as it is common, but tries to understand the basic factors necessary for their existence. The linking of internal development

of unrecognized states and external parties' influence is an example. Unrecognized states usually undergo the creation and development of own political structures. Those are, however, forced to interact with international community which limits them, influences them and obliges them to conform to international rules. Entities used in Caspersen's research are qualitatively variable as their mere enumeration shows, as it involves Abkhazia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Tamil Eelam and the Republic of China (Taiwan).

The most fitting term designating unrecognized states was introduced by Dent (2004) – sovereign land in a larger independent country. Although this term can be seen as the most adequate and accurate to cover the nature of unrecognized state entities, it cannot be used with practicality due to its length and lack of simplicity. This work therefore uses the term unrecognized state entities which best describes their essence and retains the practical use.

## UNRECOGNIZED STATE ENTITIES

Unrecognized state entities represent a wide spectrum of entities which is difficult to contain in a single definition. Pegg's definition can be considered a good one as it reflects the notions included in this work, even though it succumbs to terminology confusion, as it is pointed out above: 'a *de facto* state exists where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for an extended period of time. The *de facto* state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state. It is, however, 'unable to achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore remains illegitimate in the eyes of international society' (Pegg 1998: 1). Although Pegg's idea is based on declaratory theory of statehood, the internal political development

of entities is greatly influenced by the absence of international recognition. Thusly formed entities are considered illegitimate by international community, so they face constant pressure of existential threat. States which contain one-sidedly declared entities have a legal right to restore its territorial integrity, the international community declares. Such restoration resolves in termination of unrecognized state entities. That leads to prioritizing of internal political development of these entities. A priority of developing military capabilities, which enables effective territory control of the sovereign frequently appears.

In earlier definitions unrecognized state entities were, despite inconsistent terminology, marked as entities possessing independent government that effectively controls basic geographical attributes – the territory and the populace – but haven't gained international recognition. They managed to meet the foundational characteristics of a sovereign state. In some cases, those are ephemeral entities that exist for only a couple of months. It seems natural to establish a temporal limit to identify unrecognized state entities and to support the internal functionality. Five years of existence limit established by Herbst (2000) is an example. After achieving it Herbst assumed a legitimization of secession the international community would not agree, however. On the other hand a two year limit was established by Pegg (1998), Kolstø (2006), Caspersen (2012) and others. In the course of these two years the establishment of the entity and verification of internal functionality would take place. The establishment of a temporal limit is arbitrary and problematic methodology-wise. But without its demarcation a formation of entities without any real chance to evolve and last in the competing international community. Due to these reasons no temporal limit for inclusion of an entity in unrecognized state entities is considered in this work. But the duration of existence is used as a qualitative property to gauge the deviations between single entities.

Two types of entities are considered unrecognized state entities in this article. Entities that do not fulfil the geographical attributes but have been recognized by the international community comprise the



first group. These consist mostly of relicts of history as it cannot be supposed new states with no territory nor population would be recognized.

Hence, the second type of entities is considered in this article. These entities are internally functional but not recognized by the international community. Entities of interest include only those meeting following criteria based on empiric and juridical dichotomy and works introduced in previous chapter: unrecognized state entity is a political-geographical entity which effectively controls its claimed territory including the local population, which does not revolt openly and is viable reproduction-wise. The claimed territory must include urban areas used as centres of power by the entity for the duration of its existence. The unrecognized state entity represents a functional entity controlling the territory of at least one recognized State. It confirmed this functionality by declaring its own independence or other similar expression. An unrecognized state entity has received no or minimal international recognition. Table 3 lists unrecognized state entities meeting the definition described above and existing in political-geographical space since 2001.

## EVALUATION CRITERIA

It is necessary to introduce the individual evaluation criteria, before constructing a classification of unrecognized state entities, on which it is based upon. The evaluation criteria have been established after deliberation of works by authors from the fields of sociology, political science and geography, as the topic transcends them all. Works by Sørensen (2005), Cooper (2000), Rotberg (2004), Zartmann (1995), Jackson (1993), Anderson (2012), Riegl (2013), and Glassner and de Blij (1988) were considered, too. The analysis of works by the authors mentioned made it clear that two distinct categories of evaluation criteria have to be used. External criteria dealing with outer parties relations with the unrecognized state entity and internal criteria handling the internal functionality. Combination of both led to creating a classification introduced in the next chapter, and which takes into account the qualitative differences between individual unrecognized state entities.


## External Evaluation Criteria

External evaluation criteria are based on work by Riegl (2010, 2013) and they consider the influence of external parties on the development of individual unrecognized state entities. Three elementary groups of external parties (states) that affect the unrecognized state entities' development can be discerned in political space. These groups are used in this work. They are:

- International community;
- Regional/global power;
- Central government of the original sovereign.

Every party has an opportunity to directly impact the development of an unrecognized state entity by support and by elimination. The stance of external parties can be put on a closed interval scale. Elimination by the use of force is a negative extreme while support and recognition by international community is a positive one. Those extremes are used only rarely so distinguishing discrete grades of partial acceptance or opposition is in order.

Seeing the relations between the unrecognized state entity and external parties a hypothesis of connection to geographical distance can be set. States in immediate neighbourhood often have a different view of the unrecognized state entity, which can be sensed as a threat, in opposition to states on the other side of the world. The history plays a major part as well. It can be assumed that states that faced secession themselves usually have a negative attitude to newly formed entities. For example, African states refuse any secession attempts due to their fear of disintegration (Herbst 2000). Another example is the Republic of Kosovo – the closed and most involved party is the former sovereign, the Republic of Serbia, which unequivocally denounced the secession and labelled it as illegitimate (The Guardian 2008a). For regional scale states, in these cases states of Europe that are spatially and culturally close, its own experience with threat to territorial integrity plays a major role. Secession of Kosovo was therefore condemned not only by the Republic of Moldova and by the Kingdom of Spain (Independent 2008). Table 1 summarizes the external



**Figure 1** Examples of a 'deviant state' (the Federal Republic of Somalia) and unrecognized state entities within its territory.

Source: own processing.

**Table 1** Summary of all external evaluation criteria and the predicted entity status.

| Type of the entity  | Sovereignty |     | Supported by:      |                         |                         | Predicted entity status  |
|---|-------------|-----|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--|
|   |             |     | Central government | International community | Regional (global) power |  |
| Internationally unrecognized and non-functioning entities | Inner       | NO  | NO                 | NO                      | YES                     | Unrecognized state entity, internally inefficient                  |
|   |             |     |                    |                         | NO                      | Elimination  |
|   | Outer       | NO  | YES                | NO                      | YES                     | Unrecognized state entity, internally inefficient                  |
|   |             |     |                    |                         | NO                      | Elimination or unrecognized state entity, internally inefficient*  |
| Non-functioning entities                                  | Inner       | NO  | –                  | YES                     | YES                     | Internationally recognized sovereign state, internally inefficient |
|   |             |     |                    |                         | NO                      |  |
|   | Outer       | YES | –                  | YES                     | YES                     |  |
|   |             |     |                    |                         | NO                      |  |
| Internationally unrecognized entities                     | Inner       | YES | YES                | NO                      | YES                     | Unrecognized state entity, internally efficient                    |
|   |             |     |                    |                         | NO                      | Elimination or unrecognized state entity, internally efficient*    |
|   | Outer       | NO  | NO                 | NO                      | YES                     | Unrecognized state entity, internally efficient                    |
|   |             |     |                    |                         | NO                      | elimination  |
| Internationally recognized and functioning entities       | Inner       | YES | -                  | YES                     | YES                     | Sovereign state, internally efficient                              |
|   | Outer       | YES | -                  | YES                     | NO                      |  |

Note: \* depending on the power of central government

Source: Riegl (2013), Podhrázský (2018); own processing

parties’ influence on state entities located in the political-geographical space and describes the predicted entity status.

Internal Evaluation Criteria

Standard evaluation used to assess states cannot be employed for internal evaluation, as these are seldom established territory units that are described with statistics. Therefore, criteria that are verifiable

and relevant internal-functionality-wise have been selected. Internal evaluation criteria take into account the ability of unrecognized state entities to secure the safety, governance and basic services within the claimed territory. Basic geographical characteristics such as population or territorial extent are not included among the criteria as they are a part of the definition of unrecognized state entities. Every internal criterion can attain values of 0/1/2 according to the level of satisfaction, which



are presented below. The result of combination of internal criteria is a percentage of satisfaction said criteria, which is a factor in classification of unrecognized state entities.

- Governance;
- Duration of existence;
- History;
- Core areas;
- Unifying element;
- Monetary policy;
- Armed forces;
- Nationality and ethnicity;
- Area of influence;
- Infrastructure and populated places distribution.

*Governance.* Creation of functioning governance is an evidence of an attempt to control a territory and its administration. That is why governance is included in internal evaluation criteria of unrecognized state entities. Functioning governance is not just an effective organization structure that claims a territory, it involves legal system, taxes etc. imposed on the claimed territory, whose population complies with it.

The objective is for the unrecognized state entity to succeed in creating an effective administration which controls and governs affairs within the claimed territory. In case of creation of governance under control of other (external) party the criterion is fulfilled but the value of the entity in question would be reduced. Upholding the democratic principles is not crucial for fulfilling this criterion. The extent of the controlled territory or its change is not important.

The thresholds for governance values are described below:

- 0 – functioning governance not created;
- 1 – functioning governance created but under factual control of other, usually external, party with frequent interventions in internal affairs;
- 2 – functioning governance created and no direct intervention in internal affairs by external party.

*Duration of existence.* The duration of existence cannot be used for the definition of unrecognized state entities itself, for it would function too selectively. However it is an important trait which speaks volumes about the ability of unrecognized state entities to succeed in the space of international affairs, which was already noted by Kolstø (2006). It is without a question that this ability strongly reflects also the non-functionality of the former sovereign, who can be assumed to strive to eliminate the unrecognized state entity. The criterion of existence does not cover neither the functionality of the entity, effectivity of territory control nor any support of the populace. It is purely a time indicator of the existence of unrecognized state entity in political space. Within this work one threshold of 2 years established by Kolstø (2006) in his work is used, which can be considered as a period long enough for the unrecognized state entity to establish itself. The second threshold is set at 5 years, which presupposes establishment not only in the theatre of its former sovereign but also in an international theatre.

Values for the application of the duration of existence are as follows:

- 0 – duration of existence less than 2 years;
- 1 – duration of existence between 2 and 5 years;
- 2 – duration of existence more than 5 years.

*History.* History criterion presumes the formation of unrecognized state entity in the territory of a former administrative unit, from which the entity derives its existence. It does not necessitate direct succession in the form of secession, formation of an entity within borders of a former kingdom is also permitted. It is important for this aspect to be considered and employed during the formation of the entity in question. In case of utilization of a former administrative unit the entity may retain its existing functionality. Concurrently the sentiment about the population, which is different from the remainder of the territory history-wise can be utilized, which increases the support of the new entity. The criterion does not take into account the

territory that poses as a unifier for, for example, an ethnic group but which was not a self-contained administrative unit.

Deriving origins from previously existing entity may serve as an argument for establishing in the international space, especially in connection with right to self-determination, which is based on UN General Assembly resolution no. 1514 (A/RES/15/1514 1960). According to this resolution all nations possess right to self-determination a names political, economic, social and other reasons which cannot be sufficient for delaying of granting independence.

Application of values according to history criterion:

- 0 – unrecognized state entity formed with no bond to previously existing entity;
- 1 – unrecognized state entity is mostly formed within borders of previously existing administrative units;
- 2 – unrecognized state entity mostly observes of the previously existing independent entity from which it derives its origins.

*Core Areas.* It is of great importance for the unrecognized state entity not to control only rural or peripheral areas for its development. By controlling densely populated (core) areas the entity gains importance not only with population which it represents but its economic capabilities grow as well. Absolute population in specific core areas does not matter. The aim is to take into consideration the importance of seceded areas in relation to the former sovereign regardless of population, that can be misleading. The population of seceded areas to entire population ratio is what matters, which in turn identifies the degree of weakening the sovereign. Threshold for this criterion is set at 1% and 2%, respectively, minimum of former sovereign's population. The criterion does not take into account the degree of control.

Core areas control values are set thusly:

- 0 – unrecognized state entity does not control any areas of significance of its former sovereign;
- 1 – unrecognized state entity controls one area of significance of its former sovereign accounting for 1–2 % of the sovereign's population;

- 2 – unrecognized state entity controls either one area of significance of its former sovereign accounting for at least 2 % of the sovereign's population or at least two areas of significance of its former sovereign accounting for 1 % of its population each.

*Unifying Element.* The unifying element criterion evaluates the specific differences between the emerging unrecognized state entity and the parental state. These specifics in the form of different language, religion, cultural development or economic performance (natural resources) can serve as a propaganda material and thus significantly contribute to the support of secessionist efforts by the local population. In an extreme case, even a very simplified perception of the issue may occur to “us and them”. At the same time, these specific differences create a homogeneous environment, contributing to the stability of the unrecognized state entities.

Values for the unifying element:

- 0 – the structure of the unrecognized state entity does not differ in language, religion, cultural development or economic performance (the unrecognized state was a homogeneous part of the parental state);
- 1 – the structure of unrecognized state entity differs in one element – language, religion, cultural development, or economic performance;
- 2 – the structure of unrecognized state entity differs in at least two elements – language, religion, cultural development, and/or economic performance.

*Monetary Policy.* The monetary policy criterion is partly linked to the governance criterion. Establishment of own currency in the unrecognized state entity is assumed which is nearly not achievable without functioning governance. By having its own currency, the unrecognized state entity severs the bonds with the former sovereign and creates a new unifying element for the population inhabiting the claimed territory. The criterion does not mark the extent of using the entity's won currency which is hard to verifiable. But it reflects using other currencies and their types. What matters is whether it is the currency of the former sovereign or other

entity. The spread of own currency partly represents the effective control of the territory, whose population is compelled to use the currency.

Monetary policy values are provided below:

- 0 – unrecognized state entity has not created its own currency and uses its former sovereign's;
- 1 – unrecognized state entity has created its own currency but uses currency of a third party/unrecognized state entity has not created its own currency and uses currency of a third party;
- 2 – unrecognized state entity officially uses only its own currency.

*Armed Forces.* The armed forces ensure primary existence of the unrecognized state entity and as such it is considered a logical criterion for evaluation. The foundational presupposition for evaluation is the ability of the armed forces of the unrecognized state entity to secure territory control despite the activities of the former sovereign. Guerrilla warfare is not considered as a form of controlling the territory. The criterion considers the creation of armed forces with support of an external party at the cost of point reduction. Creating enough armed forces able to deter the international community cannot be considered, so this criterion is only related to the former sovereign.

Unrecognized state entities armed forces criterion can attain these values:

- 0 – unrecognized state entity does not possess armed forces able to oppose the former sovereign, the territory is not effectively under control;
- 1 – unrecognized state entity possesses armed forces, but it cannot oppose its former sovereign on its own and is supported by a third party;
- 2 – unrecognized state entity possesses armed forces able to secure hold of the territory and to oppose its former sovereign.

*Nationality and Ethnicity.* National and ethnic composition of population of many states is not homogenous. Perhaps due to this the right to self-determination of nations is one of the most used arguments for establishing new political entities. It

would be a great mistake not to consider nationality and ethnicity among the evaluation criteria. The basis for this criterion is the difference between ethnic/national composition of the unrecognized state entity and its former sovereign. The reasons why the composition is so important can be summarized in several points:

- emotion-based aversion towards rival ethnicity/nation;
- protection from ethnic/national cleansings;
- resistance to the oppressor;
- economic and political dominance of a group not in power and/or lacking privileges;
- effort to end economic exploitation of a group.

All the mentioned points can incite discontent of a part of the population and lead to secession or other displays of dissatisfaction or to support of a newly formed unrecognized state entity. Apart from these points it is possible to mention also a protection of a different culture, language or religion, but these criteria are taken into account in the Unifying element category.

Evaluation of national and ethnic composition of population of unrecognized state entities can be:

- 0 – dominant nation/ethnic group is the same as the sovereign's/percentage is lower than 50 %;
- 1 – dominant nation/ethnic group is different of the sovereign's and the percentage ranges 50–75 %;
- 2 – dominant nation/ethnic group is different that the sovereign's and the percentage is above 75 %.

*Area of Influence.* Territory control at the expense of the former sovereign is an elementary premise for the formation of unrecognized state entity. The degree of territory control is different, however, and this criterion is applied to measure it. By applying earlier theoretical approaches of Zaidi (1966) the area of influence has been defined as a zone surrounding the core areas and main thoroughfares. These include the railway and paved roads. The zone of control reaches up to 50 km away for core areas and 25 km for thoroughfares. Areas not interfering with these areas of influence are referred

to as areas without control. Although areas without control were supposed to serve as centres of opposition to the sovereign, the recurring scenario (opposition) or utilization by the former sovereign cannot be excluded. Therefore, the existence of these areas without control is seen as a negative phenomenon posing a threat. Evaluation-wise the unrecognized state entity would be penalized if small uncontrolled areas are present within its territory with cumulative size exceeding 5 %, whose impact could be considered insignificant. Visualization of this evaluation criterion can be seen on figure 2.

Values for Area of Influence criterion:

- 0 – large and contiguous areas without control constituting at least 25 % of the territory are present;
- 1 – single large area without control exists/ several small areas without control exist with cumulative extent of smaller than 25 %;
- 0 – none or small areas without control exist with cumulative extent of maximum of 5 %.

*Infrastructure and Populated Places Distribution.* The quality and quantity of infrastructure is crucial for control and effective utilization of a territory. That is why infrastructure is included among the evaluation criteria of unrecognized state entities. In contrast with Area of influence criterion the entire road network will be considered. The aim is to identify populated places with limited degree or

non-existent contact. This criterion evaluates also the uniformity of populated places distribution with regard to their size and the infrastructure is related to their connection.

Values for this criterion of populated places and infrastructure are:

- 0 – populated places are not distributed uniformly, with low or none infrastructure;
- 1 – populated places are distributed uniformly, with low or none infrastructure/populated places are not distributed uniformly, but infrastructure linking them exists;
- 2 – populated places are distributed uniformly and infrastructure linking them exists, main populated places are interconnected, no single backbone route.

UNRECOGNIZED STATE ENTITIES  
CLASSIFICATION

On the basis of combination of internal and external evaluation criteria described above a uniform classification is created. The classification enables to evaluate unrecognized state entities to predict their probable advance as well as to assess their chance to be recognized as a state, seen at the table 2.

In effort to cover this subject matter in its entirety unrecognized state entities existing in political space since 1945 are included. The reason is to take into account all possible variants of these entities. As

**Table 2** Classification of unrecognized state entities depending on their status in political-geographical space and on degree of fulfilling the internal evaluation criteria.

| Internal evaluation criteria   |  | 0–50 %   | 51–100 % |
|--|--|--|----------|
| External evaluation criteria   |  |  |          |
| Without external support   | Ephemeral unrecognized state entity                | Unrecognized state entity without external support             |          |
| With the support of a regional/<br>global power                        | Puppet unrecognized state entity                   | Guaranteed unrecognized state entity                           |          |
| With the (partial) support of an international community of the states | Unrecognized state entity with territorial dispute | Unrecognized state entity with the right to self-determination |          |

Source: own processing.



**Figure 2** Area of influence applied on unrecognized state entities within Somalia borders. Source: own processing.

mentioned before, the work is focused on unrecognized state entities existing since 2001 only.

### **Ephemeral Unrecognized State Entities**

Ephemeral unrecognized state entities represent the least stable form of unrecognized state entity existing in political-geographical space. Its characteristic traits are the absence of support of external parties and the inability to meet most of the internal criteria. They are entities which have declared independence but have never been able to create functioning internal structure. They often are regions of insurgency that rebelled because of the weakened central government. Due to this a gradual ending of the majority of the entities, especially if the central government strengthens can be expected. In case of long-term weakening of the central government a functioning internal structure might be formed and establishment of the entity in the next category of unrecognized state entities without external support may occur.

### **Unrecognized State Entities without External Support**

Unrecognized state entities without external support are internally functioning entities without the support of an external party. They form most often by secession out of context of decolonization, which leads directly to negative or neutral stance of the international community on their existence. This type of unrecognized state entities can exist in political space both short-term, that is for couple of months, and long-term, that is decades. Common cause of ending of unrecognized state entities without significant international recognition is a military intervention of the central government or the international community. That is also the reason why this type is found mostly in non-functioning or otherwise weakened states which don't possess sufficient military capabilities to eliminate them.

From the point of future development, it can be assumed that these unrecognized state entities without external support will remain at their present state in political-geographical space. For the change

to occur the external influence would have to alter. In case of strengthening of the central government or reinforcing the efforts to eliminate it by the international community the entity faces destruction accompanied by putting it onto the category of ephemeral unrecognized state entities. On the other hand in case of gaining the support of an external party a gradual reinforcement of the status of the unrecognized state entity might ensue along with gaining the status of a sovereign state.

### **Puppet Unrecognized State Entities**

Puppet unrecognized state entities represent not completely functioning entities with support of an external party in the form of a regional or global power. The typical feature is the inability to create functioning internal structure, whose functionality is supplanted by the external party. Concurrently the external party guarantees the existence of the unrecognized state entity and in most cases militarily and/or economically contributes to its stability. International recognition these entities gained comes generally only from the sponsor. Other states usually refuse to recognize the entity.

Stability-wise they are entities stable only as long as the support of the external party lasts. In case of termination of such support the entity falls into the category of ephemeral unrecognized state entities.

### **Guaranteed Unrecognized State Entities**

Guaranteed unrecognized state entities, similarly to previous category, represent entities supported by external parties – regional or global powers. The main difference is their relative self-sufficiency in internal affairs, which are not necessarily dependent on the sponsor. The most common form of support is guaranteeing of their existence by military force at the expense of the former sovereign, which would be otherwise able to restore its own territorial integrity.

Guaranteed unrecognized state entities are stable entities existing in political-geographical space where they are able to uphold their existence even



it case of losing their sponsor, which would classify them as unrecognized state entities without external support.

### **Unrecognized state entity with territorial dispute**

Those are entities whose independence is in concordance with the right to self-determination and are supported by a significant amount of international community. Still they cannot achieve international recognition and sovereignty because they usually do not maintain the internal functionality. Most often it is because of a territorial dispute or an occupation of the territory by an external (not formerly colonial) power. Entities are able to form functioning governance but are unable to apply it to claimed territory. The inability to create enough military capability to control the entirety of the territory is also typical.

Territorially disputed unrecognized state entities exist in the political space for a long time and rapid resolution of their status cannot be expected in the future. First possible solution is higher degree of involvement of the international community as a sponsor of the creation of a new state. The second one is a gradual elimination of the entity and its integration into occupying entity.

### **Unrecognized State Entities with the Right to Self-determination**

Unrecognized state entities with the right to self-determination are internally functional entities which are supported by a significant portion of international community. One of the reasons of the non-recognition of the status of an independent state can be an unresolved relationship with the former sovereign. The second reason might be an insufficient support of the international community, especially by the global powers. However, it can be assumed that, as the entity effectively controls the claimed territory and has support of the international community, the status of the unrecognized state entity with the right to self-determination is only a temporary one and that it will be concluded by recognition of full sovereignty.

## **APPLICATION OF THE EVALUATION CRITERIA IN THE CASE OF SOMALILAND**

With the help of external and internal evaluation criteria described above single entities of interest can be put into categories and a basis for qualitative dealing with their statuses can be provided. The resulting evaluation is summarized in the table 3. As the definition introduced in the chapter on the definition of the unrecognized state entities leads to acknowledge 25 different unrecognized state entities existing in political-geographical space since 2001, it is not possible to tackle each one thoroughly. As such this chapter introduces the application of the criteria using the case of Somaliland and highlights the most important outcomes resulting from the table 3 afterwards.

Unrecognized state entity of the Republic of Somaliland, used as a model in this work, is located in the northern part of the Horn of Africa and is officially a part of the Federal Republic of Somalia, from which it declared independence in 1991. The Republic of Somaliland exists today and not even after 30 years of its existence has the international community granted it the sovereignty status (The Guardian 2018b). Thanks to this long-lasting existence the Republic of Somaliland gets 2 points in the Duration of Existence criterion. It claims its independence based on two facts. First one is a colonial history different from the rest of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the second one is the short existence of an independent state in the 60's (Somaliland Law 2017), which was later integrated into present-day Federal Republic of Somalia (Somaliland Law 2017). The claimed territory is nearly identical to the territory extent of the former independent state and respects also the internal administrative division of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The only exception is the territory dispute with another unrecognized state entity called the Puntland State of Somalia over two provinces, achieving 2 full points for history criterion. As far as governance is concerned, the Republic of Somaliland is considered to be one of the most stable entities in the region. Even though its existence is not recognized by the international community,

the Republic of Somaliland has managed to secure bilateral treaties with both international organizations and independent, sovereign states. One of the many proofs of stability is the opening of UN representative offices in the capital city of Hargeisa (UNSOM 2018). On the other hand an effort by an external parties to alter internal affairs is noticeable, for example the use of the Republic of Somaliland sea port Berbera by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as it lost its access to sea after secession of the State of Eritrea in 1993 (The Conversation 2018). But it can be said that it cannot be considered a direct interference with internal affairs of the Republic of Somaliland as it is the case with Russia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That is why the internal evaluation criterion of governance is also set at value of 2. Since 1994 the Republic of Somaliland has been issuing its own currency of Somaliland shilling. In the year 1995 it became the only legal tender, while the Somali shilling lost this status (Central Bank of Somaliland 2018). The independence the Republic of Somaliland on the former sovereign is evident also in monetary policy, and so it achieved the full amount of points in this criterion according to the methodology. The Unifying Element criterion shows a different situation for the clan-based feature of the territory, significant as it may seem, is not regarded as important as the Republic of Somaliland strives to promote democracy, declaring a ban on discrimination on the basis of clan/tribe kinship. Not even other traits can be considered unifying as both the language and religion is the same on both entities. The main grounds are the stability of the territory and different history, but these are already considered in previous evaluation criteria. Points cannot be granted for ethnicity either. The composition of the population is nearly identical to the population of the former sovereign. Unifying element criterion therefore rests at 0 points. The data from the World Population Review were used for the evaluation of core areas. According to the data available only one core area exists near the capital Hargeisa, but it has population over 500,000, which is over 3 % of Somali population (figure 2). With the methodology selected full two points are granted for core areas. The visual representation of the area of influence criteria can be seen on the figure 2, too. Only minor

extent of main thorough fares can be seen, which is crucial for evaluating this criterion. After creating the area of influence covers only 29.71 % of the claimed territory, which falls short for even 1 point. Next criterion is the populated places distribution and their interconnection. Populated places distribution is uneven, especially the northern areas lack populated places. The most important area is the port of Berbera. Lawyacado, Zeila and Lughaya are less important settlements. The easternmost settlement is Heis. The settlements are relatively well connected, but the quality of the roads is highly debatable. The backbone route is the road between Hargeisa and Garoowe. For distribution of settlements and the quality of connection only 1 point can be granted. The last criterion covers the armed forces. The Republic of Somaliland has managed to form its own armed forces securing the safety of the claimed territory. Question is whether they would be able to oppose the Somali army if the Federal Republic of Somalia wasn't a *deviant state* and hadn't the worst results of functionality evaluation. The analysis of the 'fragile state index', created every year by the Fund for Peace, can corroborate this statement. Despite the fact that Somalia doesn't recognize existence of the Republic of Somaliland, it is unable to eliminate it by force. The last evidence can be found in the database of the University of Uppsala 'Conflict Data Program' which registers minimum of incidents between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Republic of Somaliland since 2001. It is safe to conclude that the Republic of Somaliland is able to secure its own territory at the expense of the former sovereign, gaining 2 points for this criterion.

The last part deals with findings gained from the table 3 and the figure 3, for the closer analysis of the internal and external criteria allows for observation of several interesting facts.

Firstly, the lowest level of fulfilling the criteria is achieved by Azawad by just a 35 %. Azawad was a short-lasting entity in desert regions of Mali and which existence was suppressed with help of the international community, notably France. It wasn't able neither to create governance nor to establish itself in the political-geographical space in the

**Table 3** List and classification of unrecognized state entities including the application of internal and external evaluation criteria.

Source: own processing.

|   | Governance | Duration of existence | History | Core areas | Unifying element | Monetary Policy | Armed forces | Nationality and ethnicity | Area of influence | Infrastructure, populated places distribution | Internal evaluation criteria (%) | External evaluation criteria ** | Type of unrecognized state entity *** |
|---|------------|-----------------------|---------|------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------------|-------------------|---|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Abkhazia                                | 1          | 2                     | 2       | 2          | 1                | 1               | 0            | 2                         | 1                 | 1   | 65                               | R/G                             | G                                     |
| Aceh                                    | 0          | 2                     | 2       | 0          | 2                | 0               | 0            | 2                         | 1                 | 2   | 55                               | NO                              | W                                     |
| Anjouan                                 | 0          | 0                     | 2       | 2          | 0                | 0               | 2            | 0                         | 2                 | 2   | 50                               | NO                              | E                                     |
| Azawad                                  | 0          | 0                     | 2       | 0          | 1                | 0               | 2            | 2                         | 0                 | 0   | 35                               | NO                              | E                                     |
| Cabinda                                 | 0          | 2                     | 2       | 0          | 2                | 2               | 0            | 0                         | 1                 | 1   | 50                               | NO                              | E                                     |
| Casamance                               | 0          | 2                     | 2       | 0          | 2                | 0               | 0            | 0                         | 1                 | 2   | 45                               | NO                              | W                                     |
| Democratic Federation of Northern Syria | 2          | 0                     | 0       | 2          | 1                | 0               | 1            | 2                         | 2                 | 2   | 60                               | NO                              | W                                     |
| Donetsk People's Republic               | 1          | 0                     | 2       | 2          | 1                | 0               | 0            | 0                         | 2                 | 2   | 50                               | R/G                             | P                                     |
| Iraqi Kurdistan (Bashur)                | 2          | 0                     | 0       | 2          | 1                | 0               | 1            | 2                         | 2                 | 2   | 60                               | NO                              | W                                     |
| Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan          | 2          | 2                     | 2       | 2          | 1                | 2               | 2            | 0                         | 0                 | 1   | 70                               | NO                              | W                                     |
| Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant    | 2          | 0                     | 0       | 2          | 2                | 2               | 2            | 0                         | 0                 | 1   | 55                               | NO                              | W                                     |
| Jubaland (Azavia) *                     | 2          | 2                     | 2       | 2          | 1                | 0               | 2            | 0                         | 0                 | 2   | 65                               | NO                              | W                                     |
| Luhansk People's Republic               | 1          | 0                     | 2       | 2          | 1                | 0               | 0            | 0                         | 1                 | 2   | 45                               | R/G                             | P                                     |
| Maakhir state of Somalia                | 2          | 0                     | 2       | 1          | 0                | 0               | 2            | 0                         | 0                 | 1   | 40                               | NO                              | E                                     |
| Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh)              | 1          | 2                     | 0       | 1          | 2                | 0               | 0            | 2                         | 2                 | 1   | 55                               | R/G                             | P                                     |
| Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic       | 1          | 2                     | 0       | 2          | 1                | 1               | 0            | 0                         | 2                 | 1   | 50                               | R/G                             | P                                     |
| Puntland state of Somalia *             | 2          | 2                     | 2       | 0          | 0                | 0               | 2            | 0                         | 0                 | 1   | 45                               | NO                              | E                                     |
| Republic of China (Taiwan)              | 2          | 2                     | 2       | 2          | 1                | 2               | 0            | 2                         | 2                 | 2   | 85                               | R/G                             | G                                     |
| Republic of Kosovo                      | 2          | 2                     | 2       | 2          | 1                | 1               | 0            | 2                         | 2                 | 2   | 80                               | I                               | S                                     |
| Republic of Somaliland                  | 2          | 2                     | 2       | 2          | 0                | 2               | 2            | 0                         | 0                 | 1   | 65                               | NO                              | W                                     |
| Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic        | 1          | 2                     | 0       | 2          | 0                | 0               | 0            | 2                         | 0                 | 1   | 40                               | I                               | T                                     |
| South Ossetia                           | 1          | 2                     | 2       | 2          | 1                | 0               | 0            | 2                         | 0                 | 1   | 55                               | R/G                             | P                                     |
| State of Palestine                      | 1          | 2                     | 1       | 0          | 2                | 0               | 0            | 2                         | 2                 | 2   | 60                               | I                               | T                                     |
| Tamil Eelam                             | 2          | 2                     | 0       | 0          | 2                | 0               | 0            | 2                         | 2                 | 1   | 55                               | NO                              | E                                     |
| Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus     | 2          | 2                     | 2       | 0          | 2                | 0               | 0            | 2                         | 2                 | 2   | 70                               | R/G                             | G                                     |

\* Possible re-affiliation to the parental state.

\*\* Regional/global power (R/G), international community (I).

\*\*\* Ephemeral unrecognized state entities (E), unrecognized state entities without external support (W), puppet unrecognized state entities (P), guaranteed unrecognized state entities (G), unrecognized state entities with territorial dispute (I), unrecognized state entities with the right to self-determination (S).

21<sup>st</sup> century. Still it gained points for the ability to oppose the army of the former sovereign, which wasn't able to suppress it on its own, for secession of historical regions and a different ethnicity and language of the population.


Secondly, nearly even number of unrecognized states fulfilling the criteria up to 50 % (10) and over 50 % (15). As can be seen on the figure 3 mostly the unrecognized state entities with a score of 55 % (5) contributed to that. Mainly these are newly formed entities in an emptied political space of the Syrian Arab Republic, which was caused by the civil war. Kurdish areas exploited the situation as they declared their independence, which they pondered for a long time, simultaneously.

Thirdly, it is important to say that a large number of 60 % of unrecognized state entities are at the edge of internally functional and non-functioning. The interval between 45–60 % can be considered a transitional one considering its proximity to the border of 50 %. For all the entities of interest falling into this interval a possible shift to either category of

can be supposed in concordance with the table 2. At the same time, it can be stated that, based on facts above, the borderline of the fulfilment degree of internal evaluation criteria is very thin indeed.

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which operated on the territory of the former state and used its resources, the Republic of Kosovo, which is supported for a long time by a great portion of the international community despite unresolved relations with its former sovereign, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus whose is supported by Turkish republic, and the Republic of China – Taiwan whose existence is guaranteed by the United States of America but is also slowly losing its status in the political space in favour of the People's Republic of China, showed to be internally most stable entities, having between 70 %, and 85 %.

After analysis of external evaluation criteria similar results are obtained as with the internal ones. There are 14 entities of interest without any support and 11 entities of interest get the support from various external parties. After closer examination of entities




**Figure 3** Number of entities based on internal and external evaluation criteria.

Source: own processing.

with external support a substantial disproportion can be noted between entities with support of the international community (3) and entities with support of a regional or a global power (8). One of the main supporters of unrecognized state entities is the Russian Federation supporting 5 of these.

On the basis of the facts it may seem that ephemeral entities or entities without external support would be prevalent in the political-geographical space. In fact, it is the opposite, as the figure 4 showing unrecognized state entities in given categories in the political-geographical space since 2001 to present demonstrates. The high variability of the number of entities is significant. This is caused mainly by

the decline of the ephemeral unrecognized state entities between 2009 and 2010. On the other hand, a rise in numbers of puppet unrecognized state entities occurred between 2013 and 2014. At present the political-geographical space contains only one ephemeral unrecognized state entity – the Puntland State of Somalia, but which does not reject the possibility of rejoining the Federal Republic of Somalia in the future. In 2018 the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria fall into the category of ephemeral unrecognized state entities, too, as it lost nearly all of its territory. This article, however, operates with maximum internal functionality attained, so it is considered as unrecognized state entity without external support.



**Figure 4** Number of unrecognized state entities by types since 2001

Source: own processing.

## CONCLUSION

Unrecognized state entities exist in the political-geographical space for decades. But the international community ignores them most of the time, leaving no way to deal with their situation. The aim of this article is to introduce internal and external evaluation criteria which could be used as a basis for uniform typology of such entities by doing it to lay foundations for scholarly discussion with a goal to resolve their status.

Since 2001 as much as 25 unrecognized state entities emerged within the political-geographical space, which the table 3 shows along with the fulfilment of the evaluation criteria. Based on those the unrecognized state entities were divided into created categories. With the internal functionality in mind a borderline of meeting all the internal evaluation criteria was set at 50 %. This borderline was achieved by 15 entities of interest, and it is these entities that should be the focus of the international community to constructively deal with the question of their possible independence.

From the angle of external evaluation criteria an attention should be paid especially to entities already supported by the international community. In some cases, an official support was stated but in reality the entities haven't received any or just a little tangible support. From the angle of support by regional or global powers the situation is nebulous. On one hand thanks to external support unrecognized stated entities can prevail in space, but with the conclusion of this work sovereignty and independence should be granted to said entities as it was mostly one-sidedly declared and the entities created arbitrarily. The unrecognized state entities with internal functionality but without external support should enter a dialogue with their former sovereign under the supervision of the international community as the entity in question has proved its viability to survive in space and to create functional internal structure.

## Acknowledgement

The research was supported by the specific research project of the Masaryk University MUNI/A/1576/2018 Komplexní výzkum geografického prostředí planety Země.

## References

- A/RES/15/1514** 1960: *Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples* (<https://www.sfu.ca/~palys/UN-Resolution%201514.pdf>), accessed: 2018-11-24.
- Anderson, L.** 2012: Reintegrating unrecognized states: internationalizing frozen conflicts. In **Caspersen, N., Stansfield, G.** eds. *Unrecognized States in the International System*. Routledge, London, 183–206.
- Bartmann, B.** 2004: Political realities and legal anomalies. Revisiting the politics of international recognition. In **Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., Srebrnik, H.** eds. *De Facto States: The quest for sovereignty*. Routledge, London, 12–31.
- Berg, E., Toomla, R.** 2009: Forms of Normalisation in the Quest for De Facto Statehood. *The International Spectator* 44 (4), 27–45.
- Caspersen, N.** 2009: Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States. *International Spectator* 44 (4), 47–60.
- Caspersen, N.** 2012: *Unrecognized states: the struggle for sovereignty in the modern international system*. Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Central Bank of Somaliland** 2018: Our services (<http://bankofsomaliland.net/services/>), accessed 2018–12–17.
- Cooper, R.** 2000: *The post modern state and the world order*. Demos, London.
- Dent, M. J.** 2004: *Identity Politics: Filling the Gap Between Federalism and Independence*. Routledge, London.
- Goldenhuy, D.** 2009: *Contested States in World Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Glassner, M. I., De Blij, H. J.** 1988: *Systematic political geography*. Wiley, New York.
- Herbst, J.** 2000: *States and power in Africa: comparative lessons in authority and control*. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton.



- Independent** 2008: *The Big Question: Why are so many countries opposed to Kosovo gaining its independence?* (<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-big-question-why-are-so-many-countries-opposed-to-kosovo-gaining-its-independence-783977.html>), accessed 2018-06-15.
- Jackson, R. H.** 1993: *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- King, C.** 2001: The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States. *World Politics* 53 (4), 524–552.
- Kingston, P.** 2004: States-Within-States: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives. In **Kingston, P., Spears, I. S.** eds. *States Within States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 1–14.
- Kolossov, V.** 2001: A Small State vs a Self-proclaimed Republic: Nation-Building, Territorial Identities and Perspectives of Conflict Resolution (the Case of Moldova Transdnistria). In **Bianchini, S.** ed. *From the Adriatic to the Caucasus: The Dynamics of (De)stabilization*. Longo Editore, Ravenna, 87–114.
- Kolossov, V., O'Loughlin, J.** 1999: Pseudo-States as Harbingers of a New Geopolitics: The Example of the Transdnistr Moldovan Republic (TMR). In **Newman, D.** ed. *Boundaries, Territory and Post-modernity*. Frank Cass, London, 151–176.
- Kolstø, P.** 2006: The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States. *Journal of peace research* 43 (6), 723–740.
- Lynch, D.** 2004: *Engaging Eurasia's separatist states: unresolved conflicts and de facto states*. United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.
- McGarry, J.** et al. 2004: Foreword: De facto states and the international order. In **Bahcheli, T., Bartmann, B., Srebrnik, H.** *De Facto States: The quest for sovereignty*. Routledge, London ix–xi.
- Pegg, S.** 1998: *International Society and the De Facto State*. Routledge, London.
- Podhrázký, Š.** 2018: Unrecognized state entities in the (geo)political space of the 21st century, *Useful Geography: Transfer from Research to Practice*. Muni PRESS, Brno, 506–514.
- Riegl, M.** 2010: Quasi-states terminology. *Acta Politologica* 2 (1), 57–71.
- Riegl, M.** 2013: *Proměny politické mapy po roce 1945*. Grada, Praha.
- Rotberg, R. I.** 2004: Weak and Failing States: Critical New Security Issues. *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 4 (3), 1–12.
- Somaliland law** 2017: *The State of Somaliland An Independent State and its Laws -June 1960* ([http://www.somalilandlaw.com/state\\_of\\_somaliland\\_1960.html](http://www.somalilandlaw.com/state_of_somaliland_1960.html)), accessed: 2018-12-16.
- Sørensen, G.** 2005: *Stát a mezinárodní vztahy*. Portál, Praha.
- Spears, I. S.** 2004: States-Within-States: An Introduction to Their Empirical Attributes. In **Kingston, P., Spears, I. S.** eds. *States Within States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 15–34.
- Stanislawski, B.** 2008: Para-States, Quasi States, and Black Spots: Perhaps Not States, But Not “Ungoverned Territories,” Either. *International Studies Review* 10 (2), 366–396.
- The Conversation** 2018: How an Ethiopia-backed port is changing power dynamics in the Horn of Africa (<http://theconversation.com/how-an-ethiopia-backed-port-is-changing-power-dynamics-in-the-horn-of-africa-93308>), accessed: 2018-11-26.
- The Guardian** 2008a: *Serbia refuses to accept Kosovo's imminent secession* (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/14/kosovo.russia>), accessed 2018-05-22.
- The Guardian** 2018b: *When is a nation not a nation? Somaliland's dream of independence* (<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jul/20/when-is-a-nation-not-a-nation-somalilands-dream-of-independence>), accessed 2018-11-26.
- UNSOM** 2018: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (<https://unsom.unmissions.org/office-locations>), accessed: 2018-11-15.
- Zartman, W.** 1995: *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimacy Authority*. Rienner Publishers, Colorado.
- Zaidi, I. H.** 1966: Towards a Measure of the Functional Effectiveness of a State: The Case of West Pakistan. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 56 (1), 24–40.

## Résumé

### Neuznané státní útvary – hodnocení vznikajících států ve 21. století

Svět nikdy nebyl rozdělen mezi unifikované státy, jak by se mohlo z politických map zdát. Jednotlivé státy se vždy potýkaly s vnitřními i vnějšími problémy a řada z nich nebyla schopna zabezpečit základní služby, které jsou pro stát charakteristické. Zejména v období studené války byla existence řady států přímo závislá na podpoře jedné ze supervelmocí. Na úkor těchto „dysfunkčních“ států vznikaly v politicko-geografickém prostoru nové entity, které nejenže usilovaly o nabytí statusu státu, ale v mnoha případech dokázaly být funkčnější než původní suverén, který si území nárokoval. Těmto tzv. „neuznaným státním útvarům“ nebyla až na výjimky věnována přílišná pozornost, a to až do rozpadu bipolárního světa. Na konci 20. století se zájem akademické obce pomalu přesunul k „dysfunkčním“ státům a spolu s nimi i k neuznaným státním útvarům. Především na počátku 21. století vznikla řada kvalitních prací na téma neuznaných státních útvarů, o něž se zasloužili výzkumníci z řad sociologů, politologů a politických geografů. Problematika však byla uchopena nekoncepčně a terminologie se postupně stala nesystematickou, nepřehlednou, ba přímo zmatenou.

Neuznané státní útvary představují entity vyskytující se v politicko-geografickém prostoru vzniklé procesem secese, tedy vydělením z již existujících států bez jejich souhlasu a usilující o vlastní nezávislost. Nejčastěji se objevují v prostoru dysfunkčních států, jež mají problémy s vlastní existencí a nejsou schopny potlačit rebelující regiony. Není však výjimkou vznik takovéto entity v rámci relativně funkčního a stabilního státu za přispění vnějších aktérů, kteří mohou sledovat vlastní geopolitické zájmy. V současnosti nepanuje jednotný názor, jak k takto vzniklým entitám přistupovat. Na jednu stranu jsou mnohé útvary funkčnější než jejich původní suverén. Příkladem budiž Somaliland, který představuje v prostoru dysfunkčního Somálska ostrov relativní stability a bezpečnosti. Na stranu druhou dodržuje mezinárodní

společensví od konce druhé světové války princip teritoriální integrity, jež prakticky zamezuje vzniku nových států bez souhlasu původního suveréna, avšak tento souhlas je udělován jen velmi zřídka. Výsledkem je existence neuznaných státních útvarů v politickém vakuu bez možnosti konstruktivního řešení jejich statusu. Článek poskytuje podklad pro odbornou diskuzi nad budoucím stavem neuznaných státních útvarů s možností udělení statusu suverénních států, založenou na kvalitativních datech.

Základem vytvořené terminologie prezentované v článku je kombinace vnitřních a vnějších hodnotících kritérií. Cílem vnitřních hodnotících kritérií je co nejlépe vystihnout funkčnost útvarů. Ačkoliv se obdobnou problematikou na úrovni států poměrně úspěšně věnuje organizace The Fund for Peace, která využívá souboru ekonomických, sociálních a politických kritérií, je třeba pro neuznané státní útvary vytvořit soubor kritérií vlastních. Nově vzniklé entity málokdy respektují hranice administrativních jednotek a statistické databáze lze tedy využít jen v omezené míře. Zároveň se často jedná o nestabilní a měnící se regiony, kde běžně sledované statistiky rychle zastarávají. Výsledkem je vytvoření vlastního ověřitelného souboru kritérií s vypovídající schopností o vnitřní funkčnosti. Naopak vnější hodnotící kritéria reflektují vztah neuznaných státních útvarů vůči vnějším aktérům, zejména vůči regionálním/globálním mocnostem a mezinárodnímu společenství států. Uvedení vnější aktéři se mohou přímo podílet a ovlivňovat vznik, vývoj a popřípadě zapříčinit zánik jednotlivých neuznaných státních útvarů. Kombinace vnitřních a vnějších hodnotících kritérií dala vzniknout jednotné terminologii, jež reflektuje specifika jednotlivých neuznaných státních útvarů.

Ačkoliv některé ze zkoumaných entit vykazují velmi vysoké hodnoty naplnění vnitřních hodnotících kritérií a disponují z tohoto pohledu potenciálem pro transformování v suverénní státy, je nutné přistupovat k jednotlivým útvarům individuálně. Výsledkem tohoto článku je možnost srovnat neuznané státní útvary napříč politickým prostorem a přispět tak dalším argumentem do probíhající diskuze o jejich budoucím statusu.

---

**Article received** July 29, 2018

**Accepted for publication** December 10, 2018

**Please cite this article as:**

Podhrázský, Š. 2019: Unrecognised state entities – evaluation of emerging states in the 21st century. *Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis, Facultas Rerum Naturalium, Geographica* 48 (1–2), 61–83.

**Article available on-line at**

<http://geography.upol.cz/xxx>